



PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
POST-CONFLICT CONSTITUTIONS
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ENGAGING DIASPORA COMMUNITIES IN PEACE PROCESSES

Assessment Report & Program Strategy

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ENGAGING DIASPORA COMMUNITIES IN PEACE PROCESSES¹

Executive Summary

This report examines comparative state practice of programs designed to engage diaspora communities in peace processes in their home states and outlines best practices learned from implementing such programs by the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) and other organizations. When designing programs to mitigate conflict, negotiate a sustainable peace agreement, or facilitate a transition to peace, diaspora engagement is increasingly important to promote the long-term stability and sustainability of the peace process. A review of prior conflicts indicates that diaspora communities may follow one of two paths: they may prolong conflicts through the provision of financial, material, and political support to one side, or they may facilitate the resolution of the conflict by pressuring parties to engage in negotiations to bring about a political solution. Effective diaspora engagement programs seek to assist the diaspora in furthering the promotion of a sustainable peace process.

An analysis of comparative practice of diaspora engagement programs conducted by PILPG and other organizations demonstrates that diaspora involvement in peace processes typically seeks to encourage one of five goals: 1) neutralize spoilers and build trust and cooperation among the diaspora; 2) infuse realistic ideas and recommendations into the peace process; 3) build capacity of the diaspora to effectively participate in the peace process; 4) build internal and external political support for the peace process; and 5) promote post-conflict political and economic development.

Building trust and cooperation among diaspora communities is a central part of diaspora engagement programs as well as an initial step to effective diaspora dialogue. Fostering cooperation among the diaspora community may neutralize the diaspora's role as a spoiler in the conflict by providing an avenue to engage in the peace process. Programs that engage the diaspora have fostered relationships among communities through extended dialogues, such as that used by the George Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) to engage the Ethiopian diaspora; through dialogues intended to highlight the complexity of ethnic identity within the home state, such as the Dialogue Project's efforts to engage members of the Israeli and Palestinian diasporas; and through

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shared cultural experiences intended to bridge the divide among ethnic and social affiliations, similar to the program run by several Danish Somali diaspora organizations. PILPG's Darfur diaspora engagement program used negotiation simulations not only to foster cooperation but also to facilitate an understanding of the multiple interests and positions that may be considered in the peace process.

Removed from the conflict, yet still polarized by it, engaging diaspora communities provide a useful opportunity to infuse realistic ideas and recommendations into the peace process. Diaspora engagement programs often produce recommendations and joint statements intended for peace negotiators and government officials to inform them of the diaspora community's interests and to provide a platform for negotiations. For instance, a Burundi diaspora initiative led by the Field Diplomacy Initiative (FDI) and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) produced recommendations that informed their respective state governments of methods to advance and implement the peace process. Building on DDDC's findings, PILPG's Darfur diaspora program sought to develop a common platform to inform peace negotiators of the diaspora's priorities regarding such issues as security, rule of law, and the role of the diaspora community in the peace process. Joint statements and advocacy undertaken by diaspora groups such as the Darfur Leaders Network (DLN) and the Washington Nepal Forum (WNF) also informed the peace process by identifying possible options to be included in any peace agreement and by clarifying the diaspora's interests in contributing to the resolution of the conflict. By infusing their ideas and recommendations into the peace process, diaspora communities are able to support and, in some cases, advance the peace process from a stalled position.

Diaspora engagement programs may also prepare the diaspora to effectively participate in peace processes by building the capacity and skill-set of the diaspora. Several organizations, including the African Diaspora Policy Centre and United States Institute for Peace (USIP), provide training in conflict resolution and negotiations to members of the diaspora, recognizing their importance in promoting security and sustainable peace. PILPG trained Kosovars and members of the Kosovar diaspora in negotiations skills and strategy to prepare for Kosova's final status negotiations, and trained members of the Armenian diaspora to participate in the Key West talks. In addition, PILPG worked with the diaspora community of the Anuak people of Ethiopia to build their capacity to advocate effectively for their interests, to remedy human rights violations, and to promote negotiations with the Government of Ethiopia. By improving the ability of the diaspora to actively participate in the peace process, diaspora engagement

programs promote the development of a political solution to the conflict that represents the interests of a broad range of stakeholders.

Diaspora engagement programs may also effectively build internal and external political support for the peace process by effectively pressuring parties to negotiate sustainable peace agreements and being actively involved in their implementation. By applying pressure to both the U.S. government and the separatist forces in Northern Ireland, the Irish American diaspora brought the parties to the conflict to the negotiation table. The Burundian and Southern Sudanese diasporas have actively supported the implementation of the peace processes within their home state, helping to maintain the home state's momentum in implementing the peace agreement and in overcoming domestic political difficulties. PILPG worked with the National Council for the Union of Burma (NCUB) to build support for Burmese pro-democracy movements both inside and outside of Burma. Engaging the diaspora facilitates the effective development of strategies aimed at encouraging a return to negotiations, supporting the implementation of the peace agreement, and/or preparing for political transition.

Post-conflict political and economic development endeavors are a useful tool to engage the diaspora when the conflict is too contentious for diaspora communities to directly address its root causes. The use of technology to assist the Darfur region facilitated dialogue among the Sudanese diaspora by allowing participants to focus on international development activities through technology transfer rather than on the issues that remained sticking points in the Darfur conflict. Similarly, engaging the Armenian diaspora on the need for development in the home state allowed the parties to address the difficulties facing Armenia without directly addressing the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan or Turkey's economic blockade of Armenia. To encourage diaspora support for a post-conflict Iraq, the United States government engaged members of the Iraqi diaspora to draft working papers and proposals for the Future of Iraq project, which produced proposals for Iraq's post-conflict political and economic development. Building on these working papers and proposals, PILPG's work with the Iraqi diaspora highlighted the next steps in Iraq's political development and encouraged the Iraqi diaspora to remain involved through investing in post-conflict Iraq. Similarly, to assist in post-conflict development in Liberia, PILPG assisted members of the Liberian diaspora in facilitating the constitutional reform process. Diaspora communities' support of economic and political development initiatives demonstrate its commitment to the home state and served as a platform to encourage resolution of the conflict.

Through its extensive work with diaspora communities, PILPG developed a series of best practices for engaging diaspora communities in peace processes, which include:

- The goals of the diaspora engagement program should be established at the outset and determine its structure, as different types of programs are better suited for different goals.
- Facilitators of diaspora engagement programs should maintain a flexible approach to the program structure and evaluate all program changes in light of the program goals.
- Participants should be selected through a clearly defined process and should be representative of the stakeholders in the conflict.
- Facilitators should encourage candid discussion to promote trust and further diaspora engagement among the parties and in the peace process.
- The program should broaden diaspora perspectives to allow the diaspora to effectively evaluate potential solutions to the conflict and understand the diverse interests that need to be considered in resolving the conflict.
- The program should provide the diaspora with the skills and training to increase the effectiveness of diaspora participation in the peace process.
- The success of the program can be measured by the outcome accurately reflecting the interests and views expressed by the diaspora communities.

These best practices provide important insights into developing a program to engage the Sri Lankan diaspora. As the Sri Lankan government continues to advance militarily into territory held by LTTE, the diaspora, comprised of the Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims, and other groups, stands to play an important role in promoting a sustainable and peaceful resolution of the conflict. Based on its experience and involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process over the past three years, PILPG assessed possible programming to engage the Sri Lankan diaspora communities. The annexes of this report outline the composition of the Sri Lankan diaspora, past Sri Lankan diaspora engagement programs and their impact on the conflict, and recommendations for engaging the Sri Lankan diaspora in future peace processes programs.

Although engaging the Sri Lankan diaspora will be a challenging endeavor, the potential benefits of diaspora engagement are significant and may have an important and beneficial influence on ensuring sustainable peace. The experiences of PILPG and similar organizations in designing and implementing diaspora

engagement programs provide important insights into focusing the efforts of the diaspora community on positively and effectively impacting the peace process.

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ENGAGING DIASPORA COMMUNITIES IN PEACE PROCESSES

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this report is to examine comparative state practice of programs that engage diaspora communities in peace processes in their home states² and to outline best practices learned from implementing diaspora engagement programs by PILPG and other organizations.

Introduction

Technological improvements easing communication and modes of travel have permitted diaspora communities to “build, nurture, and sustain strong links with their homeland communities.”³ As such, diaspora communities are increasingly involved in their home state conflicts, serving either as peacebuilders working toward a sustainable political agreement or spoilers seeking to perpetuate or further destabilize the conflict.⁴ To promote peace, diaspora communities may encourage negotiations and cooperation among the parties by reframing the conflict or supporting moderate political positions and parties working to resolve the conflict.⁵ However, diaspora communities may also prolong conflicts by channeling financial and material resources to the parties to the conflict to support continued military action or decrease the incentives of the parties to engage in peace negotiations.⁶

Given their strong links to the home state and potential role in the home state conflict, engaging diaspora communities may significantly impact the peace process and the development of a sustainable political solution to the conflict.⁷ Diaspora communities may reassess the issues at the root of the conflict or shift

² This report uses home state and host state to distinguish the diaspora community’s state of origin from its current state of residence. The home state is the state of origin, and the host state is the state of residence.

³ Jacob Bercovitch, *A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT: PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 17, 20 (Hazel Smith & Paul Stares eds., 2007).

⁴ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves 1* (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf.

⁵ Jacob Bercovitch, *A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT: PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 17, 26 (Hazel Smith & Paul Stares eds., 2007).

⁶ Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain, *Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts*, 25 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 7, 7 (2008).

⁷ Awil Mohamoud & Sarah Osman, *The African Diaspora as Agents of Peace on the Continent*, ACCORD: CONFLICT TRENDS, Issue 4, 38, 39-40 (2008), available at <http://www.accord.org.za/publications/conflict-trends/downloads>.

their support to leaders and groups working toward peace.⁸ Diaspora engagement programs typically include conferences, workshops, and consultations aimed at building consensus among the members of the diaspora and producing recommendations to encourage a solution to the conflict. These engagement programs may build trust among diaspora communities to provide a foundation for peace negotiations, foster realistic expectations of the peace process and potential outcomes to the conflict, increase the capacity of the diaspora to participate or facilitate the peace process, build internal and external support for the peace process, and/or promote post-conflict political and economic development.

A number of organizations have engaged diaspora communities in an effort to positively impact the peace process. By providing a forum for and facilitating diaspora dialogue, these organizations encourage productive engagement of the diaspora in understanding the diversity of interests in resolving the conflict and determining areas of consensus and discord. As part of its peace negotiations practice area, PILPG often provides extensive legal and technical assistance to diaspora communities working to influence the conflict in their home states. This assistance includes trainings, negotiation simulations, and workshops intended to build consensus among diaspora communities and to prepare for peace negotiations and post-conflict implementation of peace agreements.

Through an analysis of PILPG's work and the work of other organizations engaging diaspora communities in peace processes, this report examines the successes of past diaspora engagement programs and presents best practices developed through PILPG's work with diaspora communities. Based on knowledge gathered through its three-year involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process, this report also provides an assessment of possible programming to engage Sri Lankan diaspora communities. The annexes outline the composition of the Sri Lankan diaspora, past Sri Lankan diaspora engagement programs and their impact on the conflict, and recommendations for engaging the Sri Lankan diaspora.

Neutralizing Spoilers and Building Trust and Cooperation Among the Diaspora

As noted above, diaspora communities may play two disparate roles in the conflict in their home state: the role of supporter by pressuring the parties to engage in peace negotiations, or the role of spoiler by prolonging the conflict

⁸ Terrence Lyons & Peter Mandaville, *Global Migration and Transnational Politics: A Conceptual Framework 1* (Global Migration and Transnational Politics Working Paper no. 1, 2008), available at cgs.gmu.edu/publications/gmtpwp/gmtp_wp_1.pdf.

through financial and political assistance that supports hardline positions and violent aspects of the conflict. Away from the intensity of the conflict and the political realities on the ground, diaspora communities may adopt inflexible positions on the conflict, and getting the diaspora to think outside of their entrenched positions can present a formidable challenge in any engagement program. In addition to political support of hardline positions, diaspora communities may provide financial and material support perpetuating aspects of violence in the conflict and decreasing the incentives of the parties to engage in negotiations to bring about a political solution. Diaspora engagement programs may lessen the spoiler effect of diaspora communities by providing a structured setting through which diaspora communities may engage in candid discussion about the issues driving the conflict and further understand the perspectives of the other sides.

Intense polarization of the diaspora may make productive dialogue among diaspora communities difficult and time consuming, but the potential benefits of programs that bring diaspora communities together are significant. Programs that facilitate dialogue among diaspora communities build trust and potentially reveal areas of mutual interest in resolving the conflict. Such trust may provide a basis for further engagement, potentially increasing the impact of the engagement program on the conflict. Depending on the extent of the polarization among diaspora communities, building trust may be the primary focus of a diaspora engagement program or the first step in a larger engagement program intended to provide a basis for consensus among the parties.

Facilitating a program that seeks to neutralize spoilers within the diaspora and build trust for further engagement often promotes the awareness of the diversity of opinions in resolving the home state conflict. An increased awareness of differing viewpoints on the conflict may lead to an alteration of the positions of the diaspora, which in turn may create space for further dialogue to address the complexity of the conflict and potentially form a broader diaspora identity based on issues of shared interest. For instance, to build trust among the diaspora from Ethiopia in the Washington, DC area, George Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) initiated an "extended dialogue" program with Ethiopian diaspora members.⁹ The goal of the program was to change the

⁹ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves* 13 (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf. The Ethiopian dialogue was based on the process of "sustained dialogue," a process developed by former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs Harold Saunders to support the Middle East process. The process encourages informal sessions in which the parties determine the

diaspora members' perceptions of Ethiopia's post-conflict political difficulties and to encourage the diaspora to actively engage in peacebuilding.¹⁰ The extended dialogue consisted of twenty sessions, held on a monthly basis, among members of the Ethiopian diaspora community.¹¹ The format allowed participants to address their issues with the political situation in Ethiopia informally and to slowly build trust among them, thereby encouraging consensus.

To best assess the issues that defined the conflict in Ethiopia, ICAR first held a youth dialogue program with the Ethiopian student population of George Mason University. The Ethiopian Youth Dialogue program brought students together to discuss the conflict with the aim of producing a consensus paper for use in further dialogues.¹² The consensus paper outlined the causes and conditions of the conflicts in Ethiopia with sections on "[e]conomic [s]ources, [p]olitical [s]ources, and [e]thnic [i]ssues, and a final section that envisioned a peaceful Ethiopia."¹³ The paper assisted ICAR in assessing the interests of the Ethiopian diaspora community and in designing a strategy for a longer dialogue program.

The extended dialogue discussions with Ethiopian diaspora members took place in Washington, DC, which has a politically active Ethiopian diaspora community. The participants in the program consisted of "leaders from various segments of the Ethiopian community."¹⁴ The dialogue was conducted with a small group of ten to twenty participants chosen to represent the population of Ethiopia, and all participating ethnic groups were represented by at least two members of the diaspora.¹⁵ The content of the dialogues was kept confidential to allow participants to speak openly.¹⁶ The initial discussions were exploratory and

problems they face and then work together to build scenarios and develop a joint plan of action. Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 10-12 (2004).

¹⁰ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves* 14 (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf. A significant portion of the Ethiopian diaspora strongly opposes the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which has been in power since the end of Ethiopia's 1991 civil war. The opposition to the EPRDF is also significantly stratified, based mainly on ethnicity but also on political views of the composition of the Ethiopian state. Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 5 (2004).

¹¹ Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 9 (2004).

¹² Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 8 (2004).

¹³ Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 8 (2004).

¹⁴ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves* 13 (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf.

¹⁵ Despite their concerns with ensuring the representation of all interested parties, the conference organizers were unable to include all relevant parties, including women. Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 13-14 (2004).

¹⁶ Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 15 (2004).

focused on the interests of the diaspora, as well as their concerns with participating in such a dialogue.¹⁷ The remaining sessions built on prior sessions to discuss issues of interest to the diaspora, using the recommendations produced in the Youth Dialogue as a guide, and constructed scenarios for Ethiopia's political future and the resolution of Ethiopia's internal political conflicts.¹⁸

Although the participants were hesitant to engage in discussion during the early stages of the program, following several rounds of talks, they were able to build trust among the group. In addition, the discussions "became more complicated as participants increasingly recognized how other groups also had legitimate grievances, how principles sometimes were in tension, and how as common members of a diaspora all had interests in promoting a just and sustainable peace in the homeland."¹⁹ The program connected different groups of the Ethiopian diaspora and allowed them to further examine the contours of the conflict. By building trust among the diaspora communities and encouraging cooperation, ICAR reduced the likelihood of the parties to act as spoilers that could hinder Ethiopia's post-conflict development.

Building trust and highlighting the diversity of interests in resolving a conflict are often goals in diaspora engagement programs where the diaspora communities were created by entrenched conflicts or where there are multiple barriers to bringing the diaspora communities together. The Dialogue Project, a New York-based organization, brings together members of the Israeli and Palestinian diaspora communities in an effort to "build trust, compassion, and partnerships" among them.²⁰ The Dialogue Project describes the methodology behind its work as "transformative dialogue," which "create[s] the possibility for consensus . . . without the expectation of an end result."²¹ The Dialogue Project runs a series of roundtables and other events to engage diaspora communities in which roughly 150 people participate.²² Roundtables and discussion sessions are held in neighborhoods in New York with large concentrations of Israeli and

¹⁷ One of the major concerns of the parties was the representativeness of the diaspora group as a whole, as certain diaspora groups were not represented and there were no women in the group. Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 19 (2004).

¹⁸ Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003 19-28 (2004).

¹⁹ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves* 17 (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf.

²⁰ The Dialogue Project, Mission, available at <http://www.thedialogueproject.org/aboutus.html>.

²¹ THE DIALOGUE PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 4, available at www.thedialogueproject.org/AnnualReports/DPannreport2006.pdf.

²² THE DIALOGUE PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 4, available at www.thedialogueproject.org/AnnualReports/DPannreport2006.pdf.

Palestinian diaspora communities.²³ The dialogues address ethnic identity and seek to build trust among the communities. To build trust and encourage further cooperation, the Dialogue Project engages participants in community programs, including English-language initiatives for new immigrants.²⁴ Religious leaders regularly join the sessions to underscore the importance of cooperation and consensus building in the diaspora.

Similar to conflicts where diaspora communities are entrenched in their political positions, social affiliations may present a major challenge to diaspora engagement programs. To engage the Somali diaspora, diaspora organizations seek to build trust among political parties and clans. Three Somali organizations in Denmark – the Homestead, the National, and the Horn – brought together roughly fifty members of the Danish Somali diaspora for a dialogue on encouraging development in Somalia with the secondary objective of encouraging the formation of a regional Somali diaspora identity.²⁵ The conference commenced with a video detailing the work of Somali diaspora members in southern Somalia,²⁶ which showcased development initiatives in the region.²⁷ The video was followed by discussion where participants were encouraged to share memories of Somalia and detail experiences from Somalia. Relationships among the participants began to form as participants realized the similarities among their shared memories and experiences. These relationships formed the basis for further dialogue, which addressed the impact the diaspora could have on mitigating violent conflict and furthering Somalia’s development through the transfer of skills and resources and through financing development initiatives, in particular reconstruction projects and “micro-development projects” intended to “challenge war and instability.”²⁸ To construct a regional diaspora identity, participants were prohibited from discussing clan identities and relations, which the conference organizers saw as a larger issue that could be dealt with following further diaspora interaction.²⁹ The conference

²³ THE DIALOGUE PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 5, available at www.thedialogueproject.org/AnnualReports/DPannreport2006.pdf.

²⁴ THE DIALOGUE PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 6-8, available at www.thedialogueproject.org/AnnualReports/DPannreport2006.pdf.

²⁵ Nauja Kleist, *Mobilising ‘The Diaspora’: Somali Transnational Political Engagement*, 34 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 307, 309, 311-312 (2008).

²⁶ Nauja Kleist, *Mobilising ‘The Diaspora’: Somali Transnational Political Engagement*, 34 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 307, 309 (2008).

²⁷ Nauja Kleist, *Mobilising ‘The Diaspora’: Somali Transnational Political Engagement*, 34 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 307, 310 (2008).

²⁸ Nauja Kleist, *Mobilising ‘The Diaspora’: Somali Transnational Political Engagement*, 34 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 307, 311 (2008).

²⁹ See Nauja Kleist, *Mobilising ‘The Diaspora’: Somali Transnational Political Engagement*, 34 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 307, 314 (2008) (noting that one of the organizers referred to clan connections as “a bridge we need to cross”).

resulted in the creation of an umbrella organization of Somali diaspora organizations, the Development Organisation of East Africa, as well as the desire for further diaspora engagement.³⁰ Participants expressed their desire to unify diaspora activity to maximize the impact of the diaspora on development in Somalia through further and sustained engagement. By encouraging trust among ethnic groups and clans, conference organizers not only encouraged further cooperation among the diaspora through the creation of a development organization but also diminished the incentive of participants to act as spoilers.

Recognizing the need to build trust and encourage cooperation among the diverse Darfuri diaspora community in preparation for the peace process, PILPG worked with Baker & McKenzie, Save Darfur, and the Darfur Leaders Network (DLN), a Save Darfur-funded network of diaspora leaders, to engage the Darfuri diaspora in dialogue to identify points of consensus and points of contention within the Darfur Peace Process. Beginning in 2007, PILPG conducted two-day dialogue sessions with prominent members of the diaspora, selected based on their reputation and the recommendations of the DLN. The first day was devoted to building relationships and trust through negotiation skills training and negotiations simulations. Following the negotiations training given by PILPG facilitators, participants then applied their skills when PILPG engaged the diaspora in a negotiation simulation, in which participants worked in teams to develop strategies to approach a different conflict that had similar issues to those that are at the core to the Darfur conflict. The negotiation simulation encouraged collaboration allowing the participants to step away from their political positions concerning Darfur to consider how they would form group positions in approaching simulated peace negotiations. The participants gained insight into effective negotiation techniques as well as the necessity of consensus and compromise to forge a sustainable peace agreement. PILPG facilitators noticed a marked difference in the participants between the first day and the second day. Participants who were at first hesitant to engage in dialogue or skeptical of the positions held by other participants were more forthcoming during the second day of discussions. The trust built on the first day of the program facilitated productive dialogue on the second day, during which the parties discussed issues of mutual interest in the conflict in Darfur.

By building trust and encouraging collaboration among members of diaspora communities, diaspora engagement programs encourage communities to recognize

³⁰ Nauja Kleist, *Mobilising 'The Diaspora': Somali Transnational Political Engagement*, 34 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 307, 311 (2008).

and discuss the interests of the opposing side and provide an opportunity to evaluate the issues hindering progress toward a sustainable peace. The potential result of these programs is that diaspora communities are less likely to engage in the conflict as spoilers, perpetuating the conflict by holding and supporting hard line political positions. The ICAR program for Ethiopian diaspora and the Dialogue Project for Israeli and Palestinian diaspora focused on building trust among members of entrenched diaspora communities to facilitate an understanding of the complexity of the conflicts, while organizations in Denmark attempted to bridge clan affiliations within the Somali diaspora through discussions regarding development. Programs also may build trust by collectively teaching new skills and conducting negotiation simulations that require cooperation among diverse diaspora communities, as PILPG did with Darfuri diaspora leaders. The trust built in these diaspora engagement programs may encourage further collaboration among the diaspora communities and decrease the potential spoiler effect the diaspora community could have on the peace process.

Infusing Realistic Ideas and Recommendations into the Peace Process

The polarization often seen in diaspora communities may stall or halt altogether peace processes. Hard line positions of the diaspora may “constrain the ability of actors in the homeland to propose different ways to understand the struggle or to engage in constructive conflict resolution.”³¹ As a result, engaging the diaspora is often useful to infuse the opinions of the diaspora into the peace process and to encourage realistic expectations regarding potential political solutions.

The diaspora may add substantive knowledge to the peace process by producing recommendations or identifying their priorities in resolving the conflict. Many diaspora members leave their home states to pursue careers or academic degrees abroad, resulting in well-educated diaspora communities capable of developing informed recommendations. These recommendations and issues may provide a basis for peace negotiations among the parties to a conflict. For instance, between 1998 and 1999, the Field Diplomacy Initiative (FDI),³² in conjunction with the Belgian University of Leuven, conducted a dialogue with the Burundian diaspora in Belgium to examine the protracted conflict in Burundi in an effort to

³¹ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves* 17 (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf.

³² The Field Diplomacy Initiative is a group dedicated to involving people in the field in the peace process to promote sustainable peace. Field Diplomacy Initiative, available at <http://www.fielddiplomacy.be/>.

determine how best to promote peace.³³ FDI used a multi-step engagement approach to determine the issues at the center of the conflict, the positions of the major diaspora communities, and the best way to advance the peace process.

To better understand the issues and diaspora perceptions of the conflict, FDI conducted an initial assessment of thirty-four members of the Burundian diaspora community in Belgium considered knowledgeable on the conflict and capable of producing informed recommendations.³⁴ Although the Belgian Burundian diaspora was primarily composed of Tutsis,³⁵ FDI reached out to Hutus and Tutsis to engage both parties in the dialogue, distributing questionnaires and conducting in-depth interviews to determine the needs and interests of the diaspora communities.³⁶ Four recommendations emerged from this initial outreach. These recommendations included the creation of systems for communication, consultation, and negotiation; structures to enhance peace; promotion of a political climate capable of integrating the viewpoints of all parties to the conflict; and security.³⁷ The questionnaires, interviews, and subsequent recommendations formed the basis of a report drafted by FDI and distributed to the diaspora for review.

After evaluating the report, twenty-five Burundian diaspora members, all of whom had responded to the questionnaire, attended a daylong discussion at the University of Leuven.³⁸ FDI used the report to open the discussion with the diaspora members, asking if they considered the report to accurately and comprehensively reflect the viewpoints and concerns expressed in the initial stage of outreach.³⁹ Discussing and refining the analysis contained in the report built relationships among the diaspora communities and allowed them to further explore areas of common interest and elaborate upon areas where disagreement still existed. At the conclusion of the discussion, the diaspora members agreed to conduct frequent meetings to develop “concrete proposals for solving specific

³³ Luc Reyhler, *Field Diplomacy Initiatives in Cameroon and Burundi*, in PEACE-BUILDING, A FIELD GUIDE 90, 96 (Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., 2001).

³⁴ Luc Reyhler, *Field Diplomacy Initiatives in Cameroon and Burundi*, in PEACE-BUILDING, A FIELD GUIDE 90, 96 (Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., 2001).

³⁵ Simon Turner, *The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and Its Diaspora*, 31 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 742 (2008).

³⁶ Luc Reyhler, *Field Diplomacy Initiatives in Cameroon and Burundi*, in PEACE-BUILDING, A FIELD GUIDE 90, 96 (Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., 2001).

³⁷ Luc Reyhler, *Field Diplomacy Initiatives in Cameroon and Burundi*, in PEACE-BUILDING, A FIELD GUIDE 90, 96 (Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., 2001).

³⁸ Luc Reyhler, *Field Diplomacy Initiatives in Cameroon and Burundi*, in PEACE-BUILDING, A FIELD GUIDE 90, 96 (Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., 2001).

³⁹ Luc Reyhler, *Field Diplomacy Initiatives in Cameroon and Burundi*, in PEACE-BUILDING, A FIELD GUIDE 90, 96 (Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., 2001).

issues,” including power sharing, addressing the past impunity of leaders, a new economic system, and regional relations.⁴⁰ FDI’s work with the Burundian diaspora produced a series of recommendations on the peace process, which were published and provided to the parties to the conflict. The program also underscored diaspora support for the peace process as members committed to engage in future dialogue sessions to form additional recommendations, thereby encouraging the parties to the conflict in Burundi to work toward developing a sustainable peace agreement.

The substantive knowledge gathered from the diaspora may be used to assist the parties in peace negotiations or to inform specific activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working to support the peace process. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) was formed through the Darfur Peace Agreement to engage the Darfuri diaspora in the peace process and identify areas of common agreement to develop a platform for negotiations.⁴¹ The DDDC, a non-political organization, was founded with the goals of creating a “[s]ustained, inclusive, and transparent consultation process;” a coherent identity for the Darfuri parties involved; relationships with institutional partners who can assist in the promotion of the DDDC; and an “[i]nclusive Preparatory Committee and supporting institutions” to allow the DDDC to work effectively within the Darfur region.⁴² To facilitate its work, the DDDC partnered with local organizations in states with large Darfuri diaspora populations. These initial consultations were designed to determine the key issues that must be addressed to resolve the conflict, which were then to be utilized as part of DDDC’s work in furthering the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.⁴³

To engage the diaspora in the development of a political solution to the conflict in Darfur, the DDDC worked with PILPG, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and Concordis International to sponsor consultations with approximately thirty members of the North American Darfuri diaspora in Washington, DC.⁴⁴ These diaspora members represented the full spectrum of

⁴⁰ Luc Reyhler, *Field Diplomacy Initiatives in Cameroon and Burundi*, in PEACE-BUILDING, A FIELD GUIDE 90, 96 (Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., 2001).

⁴¹ *Darfur Peace Agreement*, art. 31 (2006), available at allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010926.pdf.

⁴² Darfur-Darfur Dialogue & Consultation, About DDDC: Background, available at <http://www.dddc.org/about.shtml>.

⁴³ Darfur-Darfur Dialogue & Consultation, DDDC Consultations, available at <http://www.dddc.org/consultations.shtml>.

⁴⁴ Susan Hayward, *USIPeace Briefing: Engaging the Darfur Diaspora for Peace*, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0221_darfur_diaspora.html.

interests within the Darfuri diaspora.⁴⁵ The consultations addressed six issues: safe and secure environment; rule of law; stable democracy; sustainable economy; social well being; and the role of the diaspora community.⁴⁶ The consultations spurred constructive dialogue among members of the diaspora. In small group meetings and plenary debate sessions, the participants drafted recommendations for creating an environment supportive of peace in Darfur.⁴⁷ The participants emphasized the need to engage Sudanese civil society groups within the state as well as the diaspora in the peace process.⁴⁸ The consultations resulted in a final report that outlined the debate process and recommendations reached through consensus.⁴⁹ DDDC used the recommendations to advance its efforts to work toward peace within Darfur. At the conclusion of the program, the participants expressed interest in continued participation in the peace process through additional dialogue.⁵⁰

Further building on the DDDC dialogue, PILPG's Darfuri Leaders Network (DLN) program sought to infuse knowledge into the peace process by constructing a unified diaspora platform to be used by peace negotiators. The DLN worked with Save Darfur and PILPG to select and invite participants in dialogue sessions, encouraging prominent members of all segments of the Darfuri diaspora to engage in discussion on common areas of concern. In collaboration with Baker & McKenzie, PILPG provided two-day dialogue and negotiation training sessions in Washington, DC, New York, London, Paris, and Brussels to thirty to fifty participants representing as many as twenty-eight Darfuri groups. Using the recommendations generated by the DDDC dialogue, PILPG produced a list of issues that provided topics for the dialogue, which were discussed by the participants to develop recommendations for consensus within the Darfuri diaspora. These recommendations were intended to provide Darfuri negotiators with a common platform from which to engage the Sudanese government.

⁴⁵ United States Institute of Peace, *Reclaiming Common Ground, Addressing Long-Term Challenges to Peace in Darfur*, (2008), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/darfur_diaspora.pdf.

⁴⁶ United States Institute of Peace, *Reclaiming Common Ground, Addressing Long-Term Challenges to Peace in Darfur*, (2008), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/darfur_diaspora.pdf.

⁴⁷ Zachary Ochieng, *Darfur Diaspora Champions Peace Agenda for Sudan*, MARS GROUP KENYA, (Mar. 20, 2008), available at <http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/multimedia/?StoryID=218357&page=2>.

⁴⁸ Zachary Ochieng, *Darfur Diaspora Champions Peace Agenda for Sudan*, MARS GROUP KENYA, (Mar. 20, 2008), available at <http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/multimedia/?StoryID=218357&page=2>.

⁴⁹ Susan Hayward, *USIPeace Briefing: Engaging the Darfur Diaspora for Peace*, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0221_darfur_diaspora.html.

⁵⁰ United States Institute of Peace, *Reclaiming Common Ground, Addressing Long-Term Challenges to Peace in Darfur*, (2008), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/darfur_diaspora.pdf.

Other Darfuri diaspora organizations also have provided substantive knowledge to the peace process by producing statements containing recommendations to the parties to the conflict for advancing the peace process.⁵¹ Through workshops and media commentary, the DLN reached out to the international community and the NGO community in the interest of producing documents and issue papers useful to the Darfur peace process.⁵² This included urging the U.N. Security Council not to impede the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in taking action against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir with regard to the conflict in Darfur⁵³ and issuing statements on the humanitarian situation within Darfur.⁵⁴ The 2008 Dakar NGO Declaration on the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, to which the DLN was a party, called for a ceasefire in Darfur, a cessation of all attacks carried out by Janjaweed militias, and support for regional mediation of the peace process.⁵⁵ By maintaining a continual dialogue and working toward conveying a consistent message, the DLN has played a key role in voicing the issues and needs of the Darfuri people and in pressuring the Sudanese government and the international community to work toward sustainable peace in Darfur.

Likewise, Nepalese diaspora programs have produced statements containing recommendations for advancing the peace process. The Washington Nepal Forum (WNF), a USIP-funded Nepalese diaspora organization, has issued statements directed at the Nepalese government in reaching and implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In February of 2009, WNF issued seventeen recommendations to the Nepal government's Constituent Assembly on the constitution building process.⁵⁶ The recommendations were developed based on consultations within the diaspora and expert opinions and included the promulgation of a framework constitution setting forth only the basic governance structures, including a federal republic comprised of ten to twelve states, a strong central government with sufficient power to resolve disputes among the states, and federal government control over water resources.⁵⁷ By providing the opportunity

⁵¹ Save Darfur, About Us: Global Campaigns, *available at* http://savedarfur.org/pages/global_campaigns/.

⁵² Save Darfur, Press Release: Darfuri Leaders Speak Out on ICC Action on President Al-Bashir, Jul. 17, 2008, *available at*

http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/releases/darfuri_leaders_speak_out_on_icc_action_on_president_al_bashir/.

⁵³ Save Darfur, Press Release: Darfuri Leaders Speak Out on ICC Action on President Al-Bashir, Jul. 17, 2008, *available at*

http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/releases/darfuri_leaders_speak_out_on_icc_action_on_president_al_bashir/.

⁵⁴ See Dakar NGO Declaration on the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, Western Sudan, March 2008, *available at* nordsud21.ch/Darfur%20declaration,%20Dakar,%20March%202008-.pdf.

⁵⁵ Dakar NGO Declaration on the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, Western Sudan, March 2008, *available at* nordsud21.ch/Darfur%20declaration,%20Dakar,%20March%202008-.pdf.

⁵⁶ Washington Nepal Forum, News, *available at* <http://www.washingtonnepalforum.org/news.html>.

⁵⁷ Washington Nepal Forum, News, *available at* <http://www.washingtonnepalforum.org/news.html>.

for the Nepalese diaspora to communicate its opinions and concerns to the Nepal government, WNF and USIP created a forum for the diaspora to provide substantive input into the peace process.

PILPG also worked with the Liberian diaspora to add substantive information to Liberia's peace process by advising the diaspora on the promulgation of a post-conflict constitution for Liberia. Following the end of the conflict in Liberia, several members of the Liberian diaspora formed the New Liberia Institute (NLI), a Liberia-based think tank founded to assist in Liberia's democratic transition. PILPG provided the NLI with a comprehensive review of Liberia's 1986 constitution and advised the NLI on participatory constitution drafting procedures, land reform, harmonization of the judicial system, reform of the executive and legislative branch, and local governance structures and devolution of political powers. The ideas generated from consulting with the Liberian diaspora infused substantive knowledge and recommendations into the development of the Liberian constitution and the implementation of the Liberian peace process.

Diaspora engagement programs may advance the peace process by providing the diaspora community an opportunity to realistically assess the positions of the parties and stakeholders in the conflict and produce recommendations to inform the peace process. Given that such recommendations are commonly developed in closed environments, diaspora members may speak candidly, free from public and community pressure, to strategize on mechanisms for advancing the peace process, develop consensus on issues of mutual interest, and explore possible solutions to areas of disagreement. The recommendations issued as a result the FDI-led Burundian diaspora program, the DLN-led Darfuri diaspora program, the WNF-led Nepalese diaspora program, and PILPG's work with the Liberian diaspora infused ideas into the peace process to advance peace negotiations and support the implementation of peace agreements. The recommendations produced by such diaspora programs may allow peace negotiators to realistically assess potential outcomes to the conflict and to assess the challenges facing the implementation of a peace agreement.

Building Capacity of the Diaspora to Effectively Participate in the Peace Process

In addition to preparing recommendations on the peace process, diaspora engagement programs may develop the capacity of the diaspora to effectively participate in the peace process. Despite residing in another state, diaspora

communities may be granted a seat at the negotiations table.⁵⁸ Diaspora communities may also play a supporting role to the parties to the conflict, assisting in the defining of positions and interests, aiding in the development of a negotiation strategy, and collaborating on ways to address possible areas of impasse that may arise in the negotiations process.⁵⁹ As a result, diaspora engagement programs may seek to prepare the parties for the peace negotiations process.

Several organizations focus on peacebuilding and capacity building within diaspora communities. Negotiation training provides members of the diaspora with the skill-set to actively engage in the conflict and to apply pressure to the negotiating parties to advance the peace process. For instance, the African Diaspora Policy Centre, a Netherlands-based diaspora organization, provides training on peacebuilding and conflict transformation to members of the African diaspora in the Netherlands to positively impact conflict in their home states.⁶⁰ This includes training diaspora community members on peacebuilding skills and techniques as well as conducting an analysis of conflicts and the role the diaspora can play in bringing about a resolution.⁶¹

The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) also provides conflict resolution training programs for diaspora communities. In 2005, USIP held a training workshop for Southern Sudanese, including members of South Sudan's diaspora community. The training, conducted in cooperation with a local NGO, was attended by "twenty-eight participants reflecting geographic, tribal, gender, and age diversity."⁶² The training program taught techniques for peacefully

⁵⁸ See Martti Ahtisaari, Mediation Capacity and Opportunities for International Peace Mediation, Keynote Address: European Mediation Conference, Apr. 10, 2008, *available at* www.cmi.fi/?content=speech&id=99 (recognizing that although diaspora communities have not often "engaged as a constituency in official negotiations to resolve conflicts in their home [state,] . . . there is increasing acknowledgement of the ways in which [d]iaspora communities are directly affected by and impact conflict dynamics back home").

⁵⁹ See Abdullah A. Mohamoud, *African Diaspora and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa*, DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES BRIEF 7, Feb. 6, 2006, *available at* www.ciaonet.org/wps/dii026/dii011.pdf (recognizing the important role played by the Somali diaspora in the Nairobi negotiations in supporting the local actors to the peace process).

⁶⁰ African Diaspora Policy Centre, Training for the Promotion of Peace in the Continent, *available at* http://www.diaspora-centre.org/Peacebuilding/Training/Training_for_the_promotion_o.

⁶¹ African Diaspora Policy Centre, Training for the Promotion of Peace in the Continent, *available at* http://www.diaspora-centre.org/Peacebuilding/Training/Training_for_the_promotion_o.

⁶² United States Institute of Peace, Education and Training Center/International: Conflict Resolution Workshop for Southern Sudanese, March 30- April 1, 2005, *available at* http://www.usip.org/training/dynamic/program_details.php?id=58.

resolving conflicts, including negotiation and communication skills.⁶³ The goal of the training was to create a network of individuals capable of resolving conflicts peacefully and in the interest of South Sudan's diverse ethnic population.⁶⁴ Connecting the diaspora with the home state through trainings may increase the impact of the training program by demonstrating areas of potential collaboration and support during the negotiations process.

PILPG worked extensively in training and preparing Kosovar, Armenian, and Anuak diaspora communities to participate in peace processes. Through negotiation training using simulations and workshops designed around PILPG's International Negotiations Handbook⁶⁵ and PILPG's Peace Agreement Drafter's Handbook,⁶⁶ PILPG worked to advance peace processes by training members of the diaspora to apply pressure to the home state government and to become actively involved in the peace negotiations process.

PILPG worked with the Kosovar diaspora to prepare for Kosova's final status negotiations. Beginning with the 1999 Rambouillet peace negotiations, PILPG provided legal assistance to the Government of Kosova in addressing questions of self-determination, sovereignty, and state structure. To prepare Kosova for final status negotiations, PILPG conducted a series of trainings and negotiations simulations. The training sessions allowed Kosovars and members of the Kosovar diaspora to learn the skills and practices necessary for effective negotiation. The simulations allowed the participants to apply those skills by assuming the roles of the parties to Kosova's final status negotiations to discuss the way forward. The simulations prepared the Kosovars for final status by preparing the Kosovar negotiators to address possible outcomes to the negotiations and encouraging the participants to consider not only their own positions and negotiations strategy but the positions and strategies of the other parties, including the Serb, Russian, European, and American positions on Kosova's independence. These simulations were used to train the Kosovars to negotiate effectively for a Kosova independent of Serbia. Similar trainings and simulations were used to assist the Kosovar delegation to the Vienna final status negotiations as well.

⁶³ United States Institute of Peace, Education and Training Center/International: Conflict Resolution Workshop for Southern Sudanese, March 30- April 1, 2005, *available at* http://www.usip.org/training/dynamic/program_details.php?id=58.

⁶⁴ United States Institute of Peace, Education and Training Center/International: Conflict Resolution Workshop for Southern Sudanese, March 30- April 1, 2005, *available at* http://www.usip.org/training/dynamic/program_details.php?id=58.

⁶⁵ PILPG & Baker & McKenzie, *THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS HANDBOOK: SUCCESS THROUGH PREPARATION, STRATEGY, AND PLANNING*, 2007.

⁶⁶ PILPG, *The Peace Agreement Drafters Handbook*, *available at* <http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/peacehandbook/index.html>.

Likewise, PILPG prepared key members of the Armenian/Nagorno-Karabakh delegation, who were members of the Armenian diaspora, for the OSCE Minsk Group's Key West negotiations regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. By providing on-site legal assistance, PILPG worked with the diaspora delegates to prioritize issues and develop a negotiations strategy. PILPG advised the delegation on matters relating to democratic transformation, the protection of human rights, and citizenship and political participation of refugees.

PILPG also worked with the diaspora community of the Anuak people of Ethiopia's Gambella region to build their capacity to advocate effectively for their interests and demands and to push for negotiations with the Government of Ethiopia. PILPG worked with the Anuak Justice Council (AJC), an Anuak diaspora organization based in Minnesota, to bring together members of the Anuak diaspora to establish an international diaspora movement structured around advocacy, uniting diaspora members, and sharing information. The Anuak in Ethiopia have faced significant human rights violations at the hands of the Ethiopian Government and have been largely ignored in the development of their natural-resource rich homeland. PILPG extensively advised the Anuak on strategies for negotiations with Ethiopian government, assisted in the development of a unified public relations strategy, and provided advise on mechanisms to support political autonomy for the Anuak people, indigenous rights in natural resource extraction, and rights to water within the region.

The AJC developed an extensive network of Anuak who worked in their communities to lobby US government officials in Washington, DC, and share information from sources on the ground in Ethiopia. In addition, the AJC organized a diaspora conference bringing together over 100 representatives of Ethiopia's ethnic groups to promote unity and reconciliation within Ethiopia. PILPG helped facilitate a portion of the conference concerning the promotion of justice for the human rights violations that occurred in December 2005 and the procedures for filing a claim on behalf of the Anuak people before the International Criminal Court. Through evaluation of past state practice in addressing and resolving conflicts similar to the one in the Gambella region, PILPG worked with the AJC to develop a strategy for negotiations and topics for discussion among the Ethiopian diaspora to develop a unified platform. PILPG's engagement with the AJC facilitated the AJC's ability to actively engage in the peace process and to advocate for justice for human rights violations committed by the Ethiopian government.

Training diaspora communities to participate in peace processes provides the diaspora with the skills to take an active and productive role in the peace process and to encourage the formation of a solution that adequately addresses the interests of all parties involved. Training may provide substantive knowledge of other conflicts and potential outcomes, may inform diaspora groups on the development of an effective negotiation strategy, and may prepare diaspora communities to assume a role in the peace process to advance the stability of the state and encourage an end to the conflict. The trainings provided by the African Diaspora Policy Centre and by USIP in South Sudan encouraged diaspora communities to engage in peacebuilding by providing the skills to work toward peace in their home states. PILPG's work with the Kosovar, Armenian, and Anuak diaspora communities encouraged the diaspora to effectively advocate for their interests in peace negotiations. By training participants to think strategically about their own interests and positions as well as the positions of other parties to the negotiations, PILPG encouraged the development of skills necessary to produce a lasting political solution to home state conflicts. Diaspora capacity building encourages focused, effective engagement capable of bringing the conflict to an end.

Building Internal and External Political Support for the Peace Process

Diasporas may provide a crucial source of political support to peace processes by placing pressure on parties to productively engage in peace negotiations. Diaspora communities may support the peace process by providing financial support to parties to the conflict working for peace, lobbying and placing political pressure on their host state to become actively involved in the peace process, and sustaining support throughout the implementation of the peace agreement.

Applying political pressure to the host state government is often an effective tool to advance the peace process in the home state and increase the incentives for parties to negotiate. Irish American diaspora groups are credited with encouraging and preparing the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to engage in political discussions and ultimately in the peace process.⁶⁷ Using its connections in the U.S. government and in the Northern Ireland separatist movement, the Irish American diaspora effectively pressured both sides of the conflict to engage in peace negotiations that ultimately led to the Good Friday Agreement.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ YOSSI SHAIN, KINSHIP & DIASPORAS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 116 (2007).

⁶⁸ Bahar Baser, Mirella Pejic, *Diaspora and their Involvement in Peace Processes: Conference Report June 2007* 25 (2007) (remarks of Feargal Cochrane at a conference held at Uppsala University in Sweden), *available at*

The Irish American diaspora initially emerged as a perpetuator of the conflict, providing financial and material support to Northern Ireland separatist groups.⁶⁹ Lobbying groups such as the Irish National Caucus raised awareness of the interests of the parties to the conflict,⁷⁰ and groups such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee, popularly known as NORaid, provided significant remittances to Sinn Féin.⁷¹ In addition, prominent Irish American leaders publicly criticized the actions of the British military.⁷² This trend changed, however, in the early 1990s following the rise of more moderate Irish American diaspora leaders, who embarked on a campaign “to shift the Irish American diaspora from supporting the most militant tendencies within the Irish Republican Army to supporting a political process. . .”⁷³

In 1991, members of the Irish American diaspora formed the organization known as Americans for a New Irish Agenda (ANIA) and actively pushed the leaders of Sinn Féin to engage in the peace process.⁷⁴ ANIA simultaneously pressured President Clinton to facilitate the parties’ return to the table, resulting in the appointment of Senator George Mitchell as a President Clinton’s Special Envoy to Northern Ireland.⁷⁵ ANIA’s support, the involvement of President Clinton and George Mitchell, and political pressure from other representatives of the United States government brought the parties to the table and encouraged them to take a more active role in the peace process. Following the promulgation of the 1994 ceasefire, Sinn Féin formed the U.S.-based lobbying group Friends of Sinn Féin, which actively and effectively lobbied on behalf of Sinn Féin throughout the peace process, raising funds and awareness of Sinn Féin’s interests and policies on

peacenetWORK.se/documents_general/Diaspora_Conf.pdf (noting the connections created by two members of the Irish American diaspora between President Clinton and Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin).

⁶⁹ Bahar Baser, Mirella Pejčić, *Diaspora and their Involvement in Peace Processes: Conference Report June 2007* 24 (2007) (remarks of Feargal Cochrane at a conference held at Uppsala University in Sweden), available at peacenetWORK.se/documents_general/Diaspora_Conf.pdf.

⁷⁰ Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain, *Home Thoughts from Abroad: The Variable Impacts of Diasporas on Peace-Building* 8 (2008), available at www.allacademic.com/meta/p251748_index.html.

⁷¹ Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain, *Home Thoughts from Abroad: The Variable Impacts of Diasporas on Peace-Building* 8 (2008), available at www.allacademic.com/meta/p251748_index.html.

⁷² Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain, *Home Thoughts from Abroad: The Variable Impacts of Diasporas on Peace-Building* 8 (2008), available at www.allacademic.com/meta/p251748_index.html.

⁷³ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves* 18-19 (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf.

⁷⁴ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves* 19 (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf.

⁷⁵ Terrence Lyons, *Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves* 18 (Working Paper, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf.

the peace process.⁷⁶ By encouraging dialogue among the diaspora on the issues impeding the peace process, diaspora groups may effectively develop strategies to overcome the points of impasse and encourage their home state, host state, and the conflicting parties to engage in productive peace talks.

Diaspora communities are instrumental in not only pressuring parties to engage in peace negotiations but also in encouraging support for the sustained implementation of the resulting peace agreement. Support from the diaspora may keep the parties to the agreement focused on implementation and may facilitate the abilities of the home state government to overcome political difficulties arising during the peace process. For instance, the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) held a six-day Chapter Conference in Juba, South Sudan, for the diaspora leaders of the SPLM.⁷⁷ The SPLM Secretariat organized the conference to connect the SPLM diaspora to the leaders within South Sudan prior to local elections.⁷⁸ The leaders adopted recommendations for the resolution of the conflict as well as the responsibilities of the Sudanese diaspora in assisting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.⁷⁹ Among other recommendations, the SPLM asked the diaspora to remain available to provide expertise aligned with the SPLM's strategic plan and the peace agreement.⁸⁰

A similar project was implemented in Burundi, where, with the facilitation of the European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), the Burundian diaspora provided recommendations on Burundi's post-conflict reconstruction. Such recommendations have assisted the Burundian government in overcoming domestic political difficulties in implementing the peace process. Burundi's 2005 elections resulted in a government dominated primarily by one party. Concerned with the inclusiveness of the post-conflict reconstruction process, the Burundian government reached out to the diaspora.⁸¹ In March 2007, AWEPA facilitated a conference in which ten members of the Burundian Parliament met with 180

⁷⁶ Feargal Cochrane, *Civil Society Beyond the State: The Impact of Diaspora Communities on Peace Building*, 2 GLOBAL MEDIA JOURNAL: MEDITERRANEAN EDITION 26 (2007), available at <http://globalmedia.emu.edu.tr/fall2007/issues/3.%20Cochrane.pdf>.

⁷⁷ *SPLM Chapters Conference Adopts Working Recommendations*, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Jul. 18, 2007, available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22906>.

⁷⁸ Stephen Par Kuol, *Critique of First SPLM Chapters International Conference*, NEW SUDAN VISION, (2007), available at <http://www.newsudanvision.com/opinion/critique-first-splm-chapters-international-conference>.

⁷⁹ *SPLM Chapters Conference Adopts Working Recommendations*, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Jul. 18, 2007, available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22906>.

⁸⁰ *SPLM Chapters Conference Adopts Working Recommendations*, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Jul. 18, 2007, available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22906>.

⁸¹ European Parliamentarians for Africa, *Conference for Burundian Diaspora in Brussels, Belgium, March 18, 2007*, (2007), available at http://www.awepa.org/projects/conference-for-burundian-diaspora-in-brussels-belgium-18-march-2007_en.html.

representatives of the Burundian diaspora, primarily civil society and political party members, in Belgium and engaged in discussions about how to improve the inclusiveness of Burundi's government.⁸² Issues discussed included recent political developments in Burundi and perspectives on Burundi's future, the role of the Burundian Parliament in consolidating democracy in Burundi, and the potential involvement of the diaspora in Burundi's reconstruction.⁸³ At the conclusion of the meeting, the members of the conference agreed to work with the Burundian Ambassador to Belgium to continue political debates and form recommendations on Burundi's post-conflict reconstruction.⁸⁴

In May 2008, AWEPA, the Burundian Embassy in Brussels, and a group of experts on the diaspora, backed by the Belgian Foreign Public Service, hosted a second conference for the Burundian diaspora.⁸⁵ In addition to Burundian Parliamentarians, private sector and civil society representatives attended as well.⁸⁶ The two-day conference focused on easing the political deadlock in Burundi to promote economic development, as well as the role the diaspora could play in the post-conflict reconstruction process.⁸⁷ The first day of the conference proceedings focused on the diaspora, its potential impact, and its cultural connections to Burundi.⁸⁸ Participants also examined the role of civil society and the private sector in Burundi's reconstruction. The second day was comprised of sessions on "education, agriculture, good governance, transitional justice, economic development, and environment."⁸⁹

Following the workshops, the diaspora developed a series of recommendations for the parliamentarians, civil society representatives, and

⁸² European Parliamentarians for Africa, *Conference for Burundian Diaspora in Brussels, Belgium, March 18, 2007*, (2007), available at http://www.awepa.org/projects/conference-for-burundian-diaspora-in-brussels-belgium-18-march-2007_en.html.

⁸³ AWEPA, Senate and National Assembly of Burundi, Programme Provisoire: Conférence Parlementaire pour les Membres de la Diaspora Burundaise, Mar. 18, 2007, available at <http://www.awepa.org/images/stories/ToR/programme%20provisoire,%20le%2018%20mars%202007.pdf>.

⁸⁴ European Parliamentarians for Africa, *Conference for Burundian Diaspora in Brussels, Belgium, March 18, 2007*, (2007), available at http://www.awepa.org/projects/conference-for-burundian-diaspora-in-brussels-belgium-18-march-2007_en.html.

⁸⁵ Belgian Federal Public Services, *Second Conference on the Burundian Diaspora in Brussels (23-25 May)*, (May 21, 2008), available at <http://www.diplomatie.be/en/press/homedetails.asp?TEXTID=90683>.

⁸⁶ Sénat du Burundi, *The Senate Speaker participated to the meeting of Burundian Diaspora in Belgium*, available at http://www.senat.bi/article.php3?id_article=793.

⁸⁷ Belgian Federal Public Services, *Second Conference on the Burundian Diaspora in Brussels (23-25 May)*, (May 21, 2008), available at <http://www.diplomatie.be/en/press/homedetails.asp?TEXTID=90683>.

⁸⁸ Sénat du Burundi, *The Senate Speaker participated to the meeting of Burundian Diaspora in Belgium*, available at http://www.senat.bi/article.php3?id_article=793.

⁸⁹ Sénat du Burundi, *The Senate Speaker participated to the meeting of Burundian Diaspora in Belgium*, available at http://www.senat.bi/article.php3?id_article=793.

private sector representatives present. The diaspora agreed to facilitate cooperation among the diaspora and Burundians who had remained in Burundi and called for the restoration of peace and security throughout Burundi, improving capacity within the administration of Burundi, continuing economic reforms, and committing to good governance.⁹⁰ The parties agreed that such conferences should be held yearly to maximize the input of the diaspora into Burundi's reconstruction. The consistent engagement of the Burundian diaspora in the implementation of the peace process and in Burundi's domestic stability has greatly encouraged the Burundian government to continue working toward a stable, post-conflict state.

PILPG's work with the Burmese diaspora community on initiatives to end the political and humanitarian crisis in Burma and assist with transitioning the country to democracy highlights how a diaspora community can exert pressure on parties to move the peace process forward. PILPG advises the National Council for the Union of Burma (NCUB), the largest coalition of Burmese pro-democracy groups in exile, which includes the Burmese Government in Exile. PILPG's work with the NCUB includes the application of various international legal mechanisms to challenge the legitimacy of the current military regime (the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)) and how to effectively press for democratic reform in Burma. The NCUB seeks a dialogue with the National League for Democracy (NLD), the SPDC, and the ethnic nationalities as equal parties to negotiate a free, democratic future for Burma. PILPG drafted legal memoranda for the NCUB on possible international legal remedies to end the political and humanitarian crisis in Burma and support a peaceful transition to democracy. In addition, PILPG assisted the NCUB and the Burmese Government in Exile in filing a rival claimant credentials challenge in the United Nations to claim Burma's UN General Assembly seat currently held by the SPDC. PILPG also assisted the NCUB in drafting an interim constitution to govern the state of Burma during the state's transition to democracy.

As programs with the Irish American diaspora, Southern Sudanese diaspora, and Burundian diaspora demonstrate, diaspora communities may play a significant role in pressuring parties to a conflict to negotiate, encouraging productive dialogue to work toward a sustainable peace, and providing valuable input into the successful implementation of a peace agreement. Likewise, PILPG's work with the NCUB facilitated the preparations for a democratic transition within Burma. Diaspora communities are uniquely positioned to support the peace process as they

⁹⁰ Sénat du Burundi, *The Senate Speaker Participated to the Meeting of Burundian Diaspora in Belgium*, available at http://www.senat.bi/article.php3?id_article=793.

are based outside of the conflict but are knowledgeable on the issues and the points of impasse. In addition, diaspora communities often have the resources and political influence to pressure the parties to the conflict to enter into negotiations and to support the implementation of a peace agreement. Diaspora engagement may channel the insights of the diaspora back to the home state to move the peace process forward and successfully implement a peace agreement.

Promoting Post-Conflict Political and Economic Development

The diaspora also may play a role in supporting post-conflict reconstruction through investing in or facilitating development initiatives within the home state. Political and economic support from the diaspora can often prolong conflicts by providing financial resources used for military purposes and decreasing the parties' incentives to negotiate. Diaspora engagement may encourage diaspora communities to provide support to economic and political development initiatives to demonstrate the diaspora's commitment to the home state and to the resolution of the conflict.

Economic development may serve as a platform to engage a state's diaspora community when the conflict is too contentious for diaspora communities to directly address its root causes. For instance, the Sudanese diaspora participated in the First Sudanese Diaspora International Conference in early 2009 in the United Kingdom.⁹¹ Hosted by the UNESCO Chair on Transfer of Technology, the First Sudanese Diaspora International Conference focused on international development through technology transfer rather than on the resolution of the conflict in Darfur. The conference engaged diaspora members and scholars from all over the world to discuss how technology could promote community development.⁹² These discussions addressed the necessity of providing adequate medical care in Sudan, the potential use of new technologies to facilitate the conservation of Sudan's resources, including water, and the best way to provide quality education throughout Sudan.⁹³ Although the discussions did not directly address the prospects for a political solution in Darfur, the discussions indirectly called for the development of a political solution to promote the effective access to and

⁹¹ UNESCO Chair on Transfer of Technology, *First Sudanese Diaspora International Conference*, (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://unescott.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=75.

⁹² UNESCO Chair on Transfer of Technology, *First Sudanese Diaspora International Conference*, (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://unescott.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=75.

⁹³ See generally UNESCO Chair on Transfer of Technology, *First Sudanese Diaspora International Conference*, (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sudanknowledge.org/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=0&func=download&id=235&chk=5feea476c28f425416aa34f693104f5&no_html=1.

distribution of technology.⁹⁴ Further, the discussions built consensus among the diaspora on the common interest of Sudan's development.

Diaspora engagement programs also may engage the business community to encourage development within the home state. Engaging the business community encourages the flow of resources and ideas into the home state's economy and infrastructure. International Alert, in collaboration with the Caucasus Business & Development Network (CBDN), reaches out to the Armenian diaspora business community as a potential source of development within Armenia.⁹⁵ The joint work of International Alert and the CBDN seeks to attain "a common vision of the South Caucasus as a region that breaks free from divisions, conflicts and closed borders – and which cooperates and connects, and strives toward an inclusive common Caucasian economic space."⁹⁶ In 2007, International Alert and CBDN engaged the Armenian business diaspora through the Kars Business Forum held in Kars, Turkey.⁹⁷ Through the forum, diaspora businesses and business associations were able to voice their concerns about business development in Armenia, including the detrimental impact of the closed border between Armenia and Turkey.⁹⁸ Voicing their concerns through the business forum allowed the diaspora community to indirectly address the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the resulting Azeri and Turkish economic blockades. The forum also connected diaspora businesses with Armenian businesses to discuss their shared interest in Armenia's development.

In addition, diaspora engagement programs may seek to increase investment in the home state by diaspora community members. Diaspora investment may be crucial to economic and business development in the home state, and the stability provided by an improving economy may encourage the parties to a conflict to discuss potential political solutions or support the implementation of peace agreement. For instance, the U.K.-based Sierra Leone Investment Forum (SLIF), a

⁹⁴ See UNESCO Chair on Transfer of Technology, *First Sudanese Diaspora International Conference* 166, (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sudanknowledge.org/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=0&func=download&id=235&chk=5feeaa476c28f425416aa34f693104f5&no_html=1.

⁹⁵ International Alert: The Caucasus, Peace and Economy, available at <http://www.international-alert.org/caucasus/index.php>.

⁹⁶ International Alert: The Caucasus, Peace and Economy, available at <http://www.international-alert.org/caucasus/index.php>.

⁹⁷ The Caucasus Business and Development Network, Conference Report: Caucasus Business & Development Network Kars Business Forum, Mar. 23-25, 2007, available at <http://www.caucasusbusiness.net/showthread.php?t=1025>.

⁹⁸ The Caucasus Business and Development Network, Conference Report: Caucasus Business & Development Network Kars Business Forum, Mar. 23-25, 2007, 4, available at <http://www.caucasusbusiness.net/showthread.php?t=1025>.

Sierra Leonean diaspora organization, seeks to bring attention to investment potential in Sierra Leone as a model for post-conflict development.⁹⁹ The organization, which works with the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID), seeks the support of the diaspora and the private sector to undertake economic reform in Sierra Leone.¹⁰⁰ In furtherance of its mission, in 2005, the SLIF conducted a conference in London with the aim of involving the diaspora in Sierra Leone's economic development.

To form the basis for the conference agenda, the SLIF reached out to members of the diaspora community to determine areas of interest to the diaspora, which included widespread corruption in Sierra Leone and creating an environment conducive to investment.¹⁰¹ The SLIF also used internet outreach to determine the percentages of diaspora members who sent remittances to Sierra Leone on a regular basis.¹⁰² At the forum, diaspora participants discussed in detail the condition and stability of Sierra Leone's economy, potential development of Sierra Leone's natural and economic resources, and the role of the diaspora in encouraging development in Sierra Leone. In addition to financial remittances, the forum addressed capacity building as a useful means of engaging the diaspora in Sierra Leone's economic reform. The forum produced a detailed plan and timeframe for increasing diaspora involvement in Sierra Leone's post-conflict development.¹⁰³

Beyond encouraging investment from the diaspora in post-conflict development, engaging the diaspora community is often effective in promoting a post-conflict political development strategy. In 2002, the United States government engaged the Iraqi diaspora in a series of roundtables on political development in Iraq following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. The "Future of Iraq" project was intended to facilitate Iraq's transition to a "government that is broad-based, representative, and respects principles of justice, the rule of law and the rights of the Iraqi people; is at peace with its neighbors; obeys Security Council resolutions; and maintains Iraq's territorial integrity."¹⁰⁴ The project consisted of

⁹⁹ Sierra Leone Investment Forum, *Sierra Leone: Embracing a Bright New Dawn*, available at <http://www.africarecruit.com/sierra/index.htm>.

¹⁰⁰ Sierra Leone Investment Forum, *Background*, available at <http://www.africarecruit.com/sierra/background.htm>.

¹⁰¹ SIERRA LEONE, 2005 CONSULTATIVE AND INVESTMENT FORUM 4-5, available at <http://www.findajobinafrica.com/findajobinafrica/sierra/DownloadAccess.jsp?docId=10025>.

¹⁰² SIERRA LEONE, 2005 CONSULTATIVE AND INVESTMENT FORUM 6, available at <http://www.findajobinafrica.com/findajobinafrica/sierra/DownloadAccess.jsp?docId=10025>.

¹⁰³ SIERRA LEONE, 2005 CONSULTATIVE AND INVESTMENT FORUM 18, available at <http://www.findajobinafrica.com/findajobinafrica/sierra/DownloadAccess.jsp?docId=10025>.

¹⁰⁴ United States Government Cable from the Secretary of State to Special Embassy Program (Jul. 8, 2002), available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB163/iraq-state-01.pdf.

working groups of ten to twenty members of the Iraqi diaspora, who met on “specific subjects such as transitional justice, public health and humanitarian needs, public finance and accounts, and political principles and procedures.”¹⁰⁵ The program sought the input of the diaspora to encourage the formation of an Iraqi state supported by the Iraqi people to promote democracy and stability within Iraq. The working groups produced lengthy reports on the substantial development that Iraq would need following the departure of Saddam Hussein.¹⁰⁶ Because the program was initiated before the U.S. assumed the administration of Iraq in 2003, however, the program was criticized in policy circles as politicizing the reconstruction process.¹⁰⁷ Further, despite the work of the Iraqi diaspora, the program did not reach the implementation phase,¹⁰⁸ underscoring the importance of considering the timing of a diaspora engagement project as well as the intended distribution of the results of the project.

PILPG’s active involvement in Iraq’s post-conflict political development involved engaging the Iraqi diaspora in the implementation of the post-conflict constitution. In 2005, PILPG hosted a series of roundtable programs with U.S.-based development and civil society organizations, U.S. government officials, and members of the Iraqi diaspora to discuss the next steps for implementing the Iraqi Constitution. The discussions consisted of roundtables, each with roughly fifteen participants. The roundtables addressed topics such as structuring Iraq’s federal system, addressing human rights violations within Iraq, developing electoral systems, protecting the rights of women and minorities, and exploring the role of Islam in Iraq’s Constitution. In addition, PILPG conducted negotiation simulations on issues related to federalism. Representatives of the Iraqi diaspora participated in the sessions to inform the participants on the current trends in Iraq and to disseminate information on the roundtables throughout the diaspora following the close of the program to encourage further diaspora engagement in Iraq’s development. The roundtables produced recommendations related to Iraq’s stability, including the need to amend the constitution and to develop enabling legislation on a number of issues to allow the state to govern effectively. The

¹⁰⁵ United States Government Cable from the Secretary of State to Special Embassy Program (Jul. 8, 2002), available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB163/iraq-state-01.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ George Packer, *Dreaming of Democracy*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, available at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DEFDE1F3DF931A35750C0A9659C8B63>.

¹⁰⁷ Roger Mac Ginty, *The Pre-War Reconstruction of Post-War Iraq*, 24 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 601, 611 (2003).

¹⁰⁸ David Rieff, *Blueprint for a Mess*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, available at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DEED91131F931A35752C1A9659C8B63&&scp=21&sq=%22future%20of%20iraq%20project%22&st=cse>.

recommendations underscored the need for Iraqi diaspora involvement in the development of the post-conflict Iraqi state in order to promote stability.

Development is a useful tool to engage the diaspora when the conflict is too contentious for diaspora communities to directly address its root causes. The Sudanese diaspora engaged in dialogue concerning the use of technology in Darfur, while the International Alert/CDBN engagement program allowed participants to focus on the current impediments to development within Armenia as well as collaboration with the Armenian business diaspora. The SLIF engaged the Sierra Leonean diaspora by encouraging investment and economic development within Sierra Leone. PILPG's work with the Iraqi diaspora highlighted the next steps in Iraq's development, allowing diaspora members to disseminate information on Iraq's development needs. Diaspora communities' support of economic and political development initiatives demonstrate their commitment to the home state and can serve as a platform that supports post-conflict implementation of peace agreements or constitutions.

Best Practices in Engaging Diaspora Communities

Through its extensive work with diaspora communities, PILPG has developed several best practices for engaging diaspora communities in peace processes.

- Goal-Driven Program Structure: The proposed goals for the program should be identified at the outset of the program and, if appropriate, in collaboration with the diaspora community, as they will determine the structure of the program, the issues discussed, and when to engage particular groups. As identified by the five types of programs outlined in this report, diaspora programs often have very different goals and are influenced by not only the nature of the conflict but the key stakeholders as well. For instance, in engaging the Somali diaspora, the Somali diaspora organizers had two goals, one for the participants and one for the organizers. While the participants sought to establish a basis upon which development work could be coordinated, the organizers sought to overcome clan identity to encourage the formation of a regional diaspora identity. Given the transforming nature of conflict, revisiting those goals throughout the program is often helpful in determining if changes need to be made and will likely facilitate the construction of an effective engagement program.

- Flexible Approach: Every diaspora community has different motivations for engaging in the peace process and, as a result, different needs from a diaspora program, from negotiations training to analysis of similar conflicts. Facilitators of diaspora programs may need to adapt their program to overcome impasses to dialogue among the participants or to meet the needs and demands of the diaspora communities. PILPG's work with the Burmese diaspora has consistently adapted to the changing needs of the NCUB, from advising the NCUB on how to challenge the credentials of the SPDC to assisting the drafting of an interim constitution in preparation for the transition to democracy. Changes to the program should be made with frequent consideration of the program goals and evaluations of the program's progress toward those goals.
- Representative Participant Selection: Selection criteria for diaspora engagement programs are of crucial importance to their success, as the participants may determine whether the broader diaspora community supports the program and its outcome. Selection criteria should be clearly defined by the program designers and structured to produce a program representative of all stakeholders in the conflict. PILPG's Darfur diaspora engagement program sought to reach a broad range of prominent diaspora members to produce an inclusive and informative statement on the issues important to the diaspora. An imbalance or perceived bias in selection criteria may result in a diaspora engagement program incapable of garnering support from the broader diaspora community or having an impact on the home state conflict.
- Candid and Confidential Discussions: Providing a neutral space for candid discussion of issues relating to the conflict is necessary to begin the process of tearing down barriers that may exist among groups and building trust among the parties for areas of genuine consensus to form. All participants must feel comfortable voicing their opinions and positions on the conflict, regardless of how contentious or controversial the issue is. The content of the Ethiopian extended dialogue program hosted by ICAR was kept confidential to allow participants to speak openly. Further, all participants must have an expectation that their opinions will be respected by program facilitators and other participants and kept confidential or unattributed. Prior to the program's commencement, facilitators and participants should agree upon the type of final product and its distribution. Due to the confidentiality concerns prevalent in diaspora engagement programs, facilitators and

participants need to determine with whom the final product will be shared and for what purpose.

- Broadening of Diaspora Perspectives: Given the polarization of diaspora communities, broadening diaspora perspectives allows the communities to better understand the issues driving the conflict and to better articulate their own interests and demands in resolving the conflict. Further, in entrenched conflicts, broadening diaspora perspectives may encourage a reevaluation of the positions of the diaspora and potentially the parties to the conflict on the prospect of a political solution. Conducting negotiation simulations with diaspora communities on a conflict that has similar characteristics to the home state conflict, as was done in PILPG's program with the Darfur Leaders Network and with the Kosovar diaspora, provides an opportunity for diaspora communities to examine their own positions and evaluate possible solutions of other parties without sacrificing their political platforms. Comparative analysis of similarly situated states and conflicts may also provide a useful tool for diaspora communities to engage in discussions of the potential outcomes to their own conflict, see alternative solutions not yet considered, and shed light on avenues for moving a stalled peace process forward.
- Skill-Set Expansion: Diaspora engagement programs may provide diaspora communities with the tools to actively and productively contribute to the peace process. Negotiation trainings, capacity building exercises, and consultation on political development, as was done by PILPG with the Armenian diaspora directly before peace talks, expand the skill-set of the diaspora communities and may be applied in working toward the resolution of the conflict. Further, training diaspora communities in skills necessary for the resolution of the conflict encourages constructive engagement in the conflict and discourages the diaspora from acting as a spoiler.
- Diaspora Ownership of the Outcome: To promote diaspora support for the engagement program and increase its impact, diaspora engagement should encourage diaspora ownership of the program and its outcome, thereby broadening support for the program within the larger diaspora community. A widely supported outcome may increase the impact of the program on the home state conflict, encourage long-term involvement of the diaspora in the implementation of a peace agreement, and encourage the diaspora to productively contribute to the state's post-conflict development. In addition, diaspora engagement programs should share the common goal of

encouraging further productive engagement on the part of the diaspora community. Diasporas are potentially powerful conflict resolution resources and should not be omitted from the peace process.

Conclusion

Diaspora communities stand to play a significant and positive role on the resolution of conflicts within the home state. Programs may build trust by encouraging cooperation and discouraging the diaspora from playing a spoiler role in the conflict. This program goal is especially important in highly contentious conflicts, where the potential for consensus is low and the need for increased cooperation among diaspora communities is significant. In conflicts where the parties are able to engage in discussions of the conflict, diaspora programs may infuse realistic ideas and recommendations in peace processes, which may be particularly useful leading up to negotiations to provide a platform for peace negotiators. Additionally, engagement programs may train diaspora to build their capacity and skill-sets to effectively support the peace process, while other program goals may include building internal and external political support for the peace process. Finally, diaspora engagement programs may promote post-conflict political and economic development, allowing the diaspora to contribute productively to the development of the post-conflict state.

The experiences of PILPG and other organizations in designing and implementing diaspora engagement programs provide important insights into potential mechanisms for diaspora engagement. Such insights may focus the efforts of the diaspora community at positively and effectively impacting the home state peace process. Through effective diaspora engagement, diaspora communities may successfully advocate for their interests in the resolution of the conflict, pressure the parties to the conflict to work toward a sustainable political solution, and support the implementation of a peace agreement.

ANNEXES: ENGAGING THE SRI LANKAN DIASPORA COMMUNITY

Effective engagement of the Sri Lankan diaspora may be developed through careful consideration of trends and characteristics of the Sri Lankan diaspora, past diaspora programs, and available programming options. The support of the Sinhalese and Tamil diaspora communities will be critical to the success of efforts to sustain peace in Sri Lanka. However, other diaspora communities should be considered and included as well to ensure that a program of diaspora engagement is supported by a broad range of stakeholders. The Sri Lankan diaspora stands to play a significant role in the Sri Lankan peace process, and, through effective planning, program implementers may facilitate the diaspora's role in working towards a political solution.

Annex A: Composition and Involvement of the Sri Lankan Diaspora Community

The Sri Lankan diaspora provides a substantial source of funding, resources, skills training, and political support to the parties to the conflict, and its past actions have been crucial for the support of the Sri Lankan government and the survival of the LTTE. After the September 11th attacks, the attitudes of states and the international community towards the conflict in Sri Lanka changed dramatically, as thirty-one states criminalized support of the LTTE.¹⁰⁹ Since then, the diaspora has channeled its resources towards peace initiatives aimed at developing a political solution to the conflict.¹¹⁰

The Sri Lankan diaspora formed largely around significant political events in Sri Lanka. Following Sri Lanka's independence, Sri Lankans of all ethnicities left Sri Lanka in search of employment opportunities overseas.¹¹¹ Throughout the 1970s, the government's promotion of the Sinhalese over the Tamils prompted large-scale immigration of Tamils seeking opportunities not available to them in

¹⁰⁹ Vijay Sappani, *Canada's Role in Sri Lanka's Crisis*, NATIONAL POST (Feb. 6, 2009), available at <http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/02/06/vijay-sappani-canada-s-role-in-sri-lanka-s-crisis.aspx>.

¹¹⁰ Camilla Orjuela, *Domesticating Tigers, The LTTE and the Politics of Peacemaking in Sri Lanka*, (2008), available at <http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/parc/CHAPTERS/Domesticating%20Tigers%20-%202nd%20Draft.pdf>.

¹¹¹ Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case 12*, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

Sri Lanka.¹¹² The Sri Lankan diaspora grew significantly following the 1983 riots, which marked the start of outright ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.¹¹³ The conflict discouraged Sri Lankans living abroad from returning, prompted Sri Lankans studying abroad to apply for political asylum in their host states, and created a wave of refugees fleeing the country.¹¹⁴ The flow of immigration from Sri Lanka has continued throughout the duration of the conflict. Tamils make up Sri Lanka's largest diaspora community, followed by the Singhalese, Muslims, and other smaller communities.

Location of the Sri Lankan Diaspora

The Sri Lankan diaspora is located primarily throughout North America, Europe, South Asia, and Australia. Sri Lankan refugee communities have also settled in India, France, Germany, Cyprus, and Malaysia.¹¹⁵ By 2002, 122,351 Sri Lankans held refugee status throughout the world.¹¹⁶ The following table details the location and concentration of specific diaspora communities throughout the regions of diaspora settlement.

¹¹² Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case* 12, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

¹¹³ Jacob Bercovitch, *A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT: PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 17, 18 (Hazel Smith & Paul Stares eds., 2007).

¹¹⁴ Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, *Tamil Diaspora Politics*, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS 493, 494 (Melvin Ember, et al, eds, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/060209sriskandarajah.pdf.

¹¹⁵ Rupa Chanda, *The Skilled South Asian Diaspora and its Role in Source Economies*, 34 INSTITUTE OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 1, 4 (Jan. 22, 2008), available at <http://www.isasnus.org/events/workingpapers/33.pdf>. Although these refugee communities may be involved in a diaspora dialogue, their concern for their refugee status may deter them from engaging in candid discussion.

¹¹⁶ Oxfam GB, FOREIGN TERRITORY, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF EU ASYLUM POLICY 94 (2005).

Location	Singhalese	Tamils
Canada	30,000 ¹¹⁷	400,000 ¹¹⁸ (300,000 in Toronto ¹¹⁹)
United Kingdom	75,000 ¹²⁰	100,000 ¹²¹ -200,000 ¹²²
United States	13,890 ¹²³	40,000 ¹²⁴
India	5,930 ¹²⁵	67,000 ¹²⁶
Australia	30,000 ¹²⁷	32,000 ¹²⁸
Italy	36,000 ¹²⁹	25,000 ¹³⁰
Malaysia	not available	50,000 ¹³¹
Middle East	700,000 (guest workers) ¹³²	not available

¹¹⁷ Paul Weinberg, *Sri Lankan Communities in Canada Still Divided*, IPS, Sept. 20, 2002, available at <http://ipsnews.net/srilanka/communities2009.shtml>.

¹¹⁸ Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, *Tamil Diaspora Politics*, in *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS* 493, 494 (Melvin Ember, et al, eds, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/060209sriskandarajah.pdf.

¹¹⁹ Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case* 12, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachmnt_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

¹²⁰ The Singhalese population in the United Kingdom was determined based on the total Sri Lankan diaspora population in the United Kingdom less the number of Sri Lankan Tamils residing in the United Kingdom. Information on the total Sri Lankan population in the United Kingdom from: Sean O'Neill, *Petrol Station Scam 'was Masterminded by the Tamil Tigers'*, *TIMESONLINE*, Apr. 23, 2007, available at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1690415.ece> (estimating the number of Sri Lankans in the United Kingdom as 175,000).

¹²¹ Jo Becker, *Tiger at the Door*, *GUARDIAN.CO.UK*, Mar. 16, 2006, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/mar/16/comment>.

¹²² *British Government will not de-proscribe the LTTE - British High Commission*, *ASIAN TRIBUNE*, Feb. 19, 2007, available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/4612>.

¹²³ US English Foundation, US English Foundation Research, *Many Languages, One America, Languages of the U.S.A.*, available at <http://www.usefoundation.org/view/29>.

¹²⁴ Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, *Tamil Diaspora Politics*, in *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS* 493, 494 (Melvin Ember, et al, eds, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/060209sriskandarajah.pdf.

¹²⁵ The Singhalese population in India was determined based on the total Sri Lankan diaspora population in India less the number of Sri Lankan Tamils residing in India. Information on the total Sri Lankan population in India from: UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, *STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2007: TRENDS IN DISPLACEMENT, PROTECTION AND SOLUTIONS* 78 (2007), available at <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4981b19d2.html> (listing the number of Sri Lankan refugees in India as 72, 934),

¹²⁶ Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, *Tamil Diaspora Politics*, in *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS* 493, 494 (Melvin Ember, et al, eds, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/060209sriskandarajah.pdf.

¹²⁷ GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, *THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA: STATISTICS FROM THE 2006 CENSUS* 29 (2008), available at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/research/_pdf/poa-2008.pdf.

¹²⁸ GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, *THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA: STATISTICS FROM THE 2006 CENSUS* 29 (2008), available at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/research/_pdf/poa-2008.pdf.

¹²⁹ The Singhalese population in Italy was determined based on the total Sri Lankan diaspora population in Italy less the number of Sri Lankan Tamils residing in Italy. Information on the total Sri Lankan population in Italy from: Demo.istat.it, *Foreigner Citizens. Demographic Balance for the Year 2007 and Resident Population on 31th December - All Countries of Citizenship*, available at http://demo.istat.it/str2007/index_e.html.

¹³⁰ *LTTE's Illegal Phone Card Racket Busted in Palermo, Italy*, *ASIAN TRIBUNE*, Apr. 30, 2008, available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/10843>.

¹³¹ TamilNet, *"It Is Now the Tamil Diaspora,"* (Sep. 6, 2008), available at <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=26851>.

The Tamil Diaspora

The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora consists of approximately 600,000 to 800,000 people worldwide and ninety percent of all migrants from Sri Lanka.¹³³ One-third of the total Sri Lankan Tamil population is now part of the Sri Lankan diaspora.¹³⁴ The Tamil diaspora is primarily composed of refugees who left Sri Lanka after 1983, maintain strong ties to Sri Lanka, and follow events surrounding the conflict.¹³⁵ Experiences of persecution and alienation often shape the Tamil diaspora's approach to the Sri Lankan conflict, as well as their experiences participating in diaspora programs and conferences.¹³⁶ As a result, effective engagement of the Tamil diaspora will need to recognize these experiences and encourage discussion of ways to address them.

While the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is the largest Sri Lankan diaspora community, it is by no means homogeneous.¹³⁷ The diaspora "is divided not only by premigratory cleavages along lines of caste, class, gender, village or town of origin, education, and religion, but also by differences arising from the process of migration."¹³⁸ Many Tamils from Sri Lanka view themselves as part of the larger Tamil diaspora, which include Tamils from India's Tamil Nadu state,¹³⁹ and receive political support from the large Indian Tamil population.¹⁴⁰

¹³² Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case* 12, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

¹³³ Human Rights Watch, *Funding the "Final War," LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora*, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, (Mar. 16, 2006), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/03/14/funding-final-war>.

¹³⁴ C. Christine Fair, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT, PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 172, 172 (Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., 2007).

¹³⁵ Markus Butler, *Potentials and Limitations of the Second-Generation Tamil Diaspora to Engage in the Sri Lankan Peace Process*, Working Paper Series in Intercultural Conflict Management No. 2, (2007), available at MA-ICM_Working_Paper_Series_No._2_B_tler.pdf.

¹³⁶ Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, *Tamil Diaspora Politics*, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS 493, 495 (Melvin Ember, et al, eds, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/060209sriskandarajah.pdf.

¹³⁷ Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain, *Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts*, 25 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 7, 23 (2008); C. Christine Fair, *Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements*, 11 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 125, 139 (2005).

¹³⁸ Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, *Tamil Diaspora Politics*, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS 493, 495 (Melvin Ember, et al, eds, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/060209sriskandarajah.pdf.

¹³⁹ C. Christine Fair, *Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements*, 11 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 125, 139 (2005).

¹⁴⁰ Iftikhar Gilani, *India Shifts Stand on Sri Lanka*, DAILY TIMES, (Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\02\13\story_13-2-2009_pg4_7.

Further, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is not unified in its support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), despite the LTTE's claims that they represent the Tamil diaspora.¹⁴¹ Tamils who left prior to the LTTE's formation in the late 1970s are less likely to uniformly support the LTTE.¹⁴² Members of the Tamil diaspora who left Sri Lanka after 1983 often formed allegiances with the LTTE prior to their departure and have retained those connections in their host states.¹⁴³ However, even such "politicized" Tamils are not uniform in their support for the LTTE.¹⁴⁴ The formation of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), a breakaway faction of the LTTE, in 2004 created divisions within the diaspora community, which the LTTE went to great lengths to remedy, reshuffling leaders within the diaspora community.¹⁴⁵ However, the potential for such divisions indicates weaknesses in the support for the LTTE among the diaspora, implying that the diaspora may be amenable to discussing alternatives to LTTE leadership.

The Tamil diaspora has been the most active Sri Lankan diaspora group, advocating for Sri Lankan Tamils and some advocating for the LTTE. In response to systematic repression of Tamil culture in Sri Lanka, the Tamil diaspora developed strong cultural, linguistic, and religious ties that enabled them to spread information about Sri Lankan Tamils and to effectively communicate their message within their host states.¹⁴⁶ Capitalizing on this ability, the LTTE mobilized the Tamil diaspora by organizing a global network of LTTE offices and contacts to funnel monetary and material support to Sri Lanka.¹⁴⁷ When several states banned the LTTE, the LTTE formed new organizations under which to operate.¹⁴⁸ The Tamil diaspora engages in a range of activities that support awareness of Tamil grievances as well as promotion of Tamil nationalism,

¹⁴¹ Asoka Bandarage, *The Sri Lankan Conflict: A Multi-Polar Approach*, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Jun. 15, 2008, available at <http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1725/>.

¹⁴² C. Christine Fair, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT, PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 172, 179 (Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., 2007).

¹⁴³ Camilla Orjuela, *Domesticating Tigers, The LTTE and the Politics of Peacemaking in Sri Lanka*, (2008), available at <http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/parc/CHAPTERS/Domesticating%20Tigers%20-%202nd%20Draft.pdf>.

¹⁴⁴ See ØIVIND FUGLERUND, LIFE ON THE OUTSIDE: THE TAMIL DIASPORA AND LONG DISTANCE NATIONALISM 85 (1999) (noting that in Norway, Tamil participation in political organizations is estimated at 5-10% of the population, with the percentage actively supporting the LTTE even smaller).

¹⁴⁵ JONATHAN GOODHAND AND BART KLEM, AID, CONFLICT, AND PEACEBUILDING IN SRI LANKA: 2000-2005 47 (2005), available at siteresources.worldbank.org/SRILANKAEXTN/Resources/SLAidConflictPeace.pdf.

¹⁴⁶ C. Christine Fair, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT, PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 172, 175 (Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., 2007).

¹⁴⁷ Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain, *Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts*, 25 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 7, 11 (2008); C. Christine Fair, *Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements*, 11 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 125,139 (2005).

¹⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Funding the "Final War," LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora*, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, (Mar. 16, 2006), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/03/14/funding-final-war>.

including fundraising, providing supplies, disseminating information, and lobbying host-state governments.

The financial support provided by the Tamil diaspora to the LTTE stems from both voluntary and coerced donations. In 2004, estimates indicate that on a monthly basis the LTTE raised approximately US\$650,000 in Switzerland, US\$1,000,000 in Canada, and US\$385,000 in the United Kingdom.¹⁴⁹ While the Tamil diaspora community argues that their contributions are intended to support peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, the funds often are used to renew the conflict.¹⁵⁰ In addition to soliciting donations from the diaspora, the LTTE frequently establishes “ownership by proxy” in legitimate Tamil diaspora businesses, providing the initial capital for the launch of a Tamil business in return for a share of the business’s profits.¹⁵¹ Estimates place the amount of revenue generated by such businesses at over \$6.5 million in 1999.¹⁵²

The significant shift in the international community’s attitude toward the LTTE following the September 11th attacks, along with the criminalization of supporting the LTTE, dramatically slowed donations from the diaspora.¹⁵³ The international community’s restrictions on associating with or assisting the LTTE may encourage diaspora community members to engage in diaspora programs to maintain their connection to Sri Lanka.

Political lobbying is also a major activity of the Tamil diaspora. The Tamil diaspora has used media teams, lobbyists, and charities to effectively pressure host-state governments for sympathy and support of Sri Lankan Tamil grievances.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ C. Christine Fair, *Urban Battlefields of South Asia, Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan*, RAND CORPORATION (2004), available at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG210.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage*, (Feb. 20, 2008), available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5305&CFID=64958560&CFTOKEN=23836462>; C. Christine Fair, *Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements*, 11 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 125,139 (2005). Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain, *Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts*, 25 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 7, 11 (2008).

¹⁵¹ Peter Chalk, *The Tiger’s Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 9 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 97, 101 (2008).

¹⁵² Peter Chalk, *The Tiger’s Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 9 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 97, 101 (2008).

¹⁵³ Peter Chalk, *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s Internal Organization and Operations: A Preliminary Analysis*, A CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE PUBLICATION (Mar. 17, 2000), available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/com77e.htm>.

¹⁵⁴ Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain, *Home Thoughts from Abroad: The Variable Impact of Diasporas on Peace Building*, ISA 49TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa08/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=b34f49b700bd2df6a3bde249eb07f14b.

The Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT) is the primary lobbying arm raising awareness of the Tamil grievances within the government of Canada. FACT is seen as “an umbrella organization of ten Tamil organizations which has a pro-secessionist stance”¹⁵⁵ and focuses its efforts on lobbying members of the Canadian Parliament.¹⁵⁶ The large networks maintained by FACT and similar organizations may provide a vehicle for engaging the Tamil diaspora.

Further, the Tamil diaspora has been effective at mobilizing the Tamil communities throughout Canada into strong constituencies sympathetic to Tamil grievances.¹⁵⁷ Recognizing the size and importance of the Tamil diaspora in Canada, the Canadian government provided an informal liaison to the Tamil community through the Department of Cultural Affairs and Immigration.¹⁵⁸ To maintain communication between the government and the Tamil community, the liaison attends community meetings and cultural events and assists Tamils in resettling in Canada.¹⁵⁹ This liaison may provide useful insight into the leaders of the Canadian Tamil diaspora community as well as potential participants to involve in a diaspora engagement program.

The Tamil diaspora has a well-established network of media and broadcast sources through which they disseminate information on Tamils and the conflict. Such sources include daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly publications on Tamils and the conflict;¹⁶⁰ a strong presence online in large organizations including Tamilnation.org and TamilNet.com;¹⁶¹ and Tamil language radio shows.¹⁶² The extensive network of Tamil media outlets permits the diaspora to remain closely connected and to raise awareness of Tamil issues in Sri Lanka. These media outlets play an important role in advancing new ideas and connecting the Tamil community. However, media outlets have also served as a medium to entrench

¹⁵⁵ Sarah Wayland, *Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora*, 30 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 405, 421 (2004).

¹⁵⁶ Sarah Wayland, *Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora*, 30 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 405, 421 (2004).

¹⁵⁷ C. Christine Fair, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT, PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 172, 184 (Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., 2007).

¹⁵⁸ Canada, House of Commons Debates, (Feb. 4, 2009), available at <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2&DocId=3645216>.

¹⁵⁹ *Canadian Parliament Debates the Sri Lankan Situation*, SRI LANKA GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/02/canadian-parliament-debates-sri-lankan_390.html.

¹⁶⁰ A.J.V. Chandrakanthan, *Eelam Tamil Nationalism: An Inside View*, in SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM 157, 170 (A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, 2000).

¹⁶¹ See www.tamilnation.org and www.tamilnet.com. See also <http://www.eelamweb.com/>, <http://www.sibernews.com/>, <http://www.tamilnelamnews.com/>, <http://www.tamilguardian.com/>.

¹⁶² Sarah Wayland, *Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora*, 30 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 405, 418 (2004).

hard line ideas and discourage consensus-building. The potentially significant impact the Tamil diaspora media [may have in either promoting or discrediting any program that engages the Sri Lanka diaspora] is a factor that will need to be carefully considered.

The Tamil diaspora organizes protest marches, demonstrations, and video and photographic exhibits to garner support and spread information in their host states about the Tamils' cause. Recently, Tamils have held processions, rallies, and protests to bring light to the current humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka.¹⁶³ These events generally engage large numbers of people, with some as large as 120,000 people.¹⁶⁴ Tamil diaspora organizations provide materials, such as posters and photographs, to the participants to demonstrate the presence of the diaspora in the host state and disseminate information about the situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka.¹⁶⁵ These processions and rallies indicate the strength of the Tamil diaspora's organizational capabilities, a strength that could both contribute to, as well as interfere with a program of diaspora engagement.

Students living in Tamil diasporas often play active roles in organizing and educating each other and their host states about Tamil interests.¹⁶⁶ Students in Australia, Canada, and Britain lobby within academic spheres¹⁶⁷ and connect the student population to the greater Tamil diaspora in the host state.¹⁶⁸ Further, prior school affiliations and alumni networks, particularly those in Sri Lanka, connect members of the Tamil diaspora in different states. Using the internet, Tamil student groups distribute news about the conflict and rally support for upcoming

¹⁶³ TamilNet, *Swiss Tamil Youth Demonstrate in Front of UN*, (Jan. 23, 2009), available at <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=28106>; Newstin, *Swiss Tamil Youth Demonstrate in Front of UN*, (Jan. 23, 2009), available at <http://www.newstin.com/tag/us/99920297>.

¹⁶⁴ Leslie Ferenc, *Human chain of Tamils circles city core*, Toronto Star, Mar. 17, 2009 available at <http://www.thestar.com/article/603446>; AFP, *50,000 in London Tamil protest demanding ceasefire*, Jan. 31, 2009 available at http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/afp/090131/world/srilanka_unrest_britain_demo_1; ANI, *Tamil supporters protest over Sri Lankan issue in Mumbai*, Mar. 1, 2009, available at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/india-news/tamil-supporters-protest-over-sri-lankan-issue-in-mumbai_100161399.html; Saroj Pathirana, *Tamil Diaspora United in Anger*, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7872814.stm.

¹⁶⁵ Newstin, *Swiss Tamil Youth Demonstrate in Front of UN*, (Jan. 23, 2009), available at <http://www.newstin.com/tag/us/99920297>; Saroj Pathirana, *Tamil Diaspora United in Anger*, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7872814.stm.

¹⁶⁶ A.J.V. Chandrakanthan, *Eelam Tamil Nationalism: An Inside View*, in SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM 157, 172 (A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, 2000).

¹⁶⁷ A.J.V. Chandrakanthan, *Eelam Tamil Nationalism: An Inside View*, in SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM 157, 172 (A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, 2000).

¹⁶⁸ See Carleton University Tamil Student's Association, *The Wall*, available at <http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=2248355748>.

diaspora events.¹⁶⁹ These groups are generally initiated by students and receive support from the school where they were founded.¹⁷⁰ These student organizations serve as the starting point for many leaders in the Tamil diaspora, and, as a result, engaging members of youth organizations may prove valuable in encouraging further diaspora involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process.

Within their extensive network, the Tamil diaspora also engages in capacity transfer to Sri Lanka. For instance, the Medical Institute for Tamils sends missions of medical personnel to Sri Lanka to aid persons affected by the conflict in the northern region of Sri Lanka.¹⁷¹ These missions are composed of volunteers from North America, primarily from Canada, who wish to assist the Tamil population.¹⁷² Through ongoing memberships, Tamil organizations coordinate the skills of the Tamil diaspora and transfer them to aid the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Volunteers in these programs gain a firsthand perspective on the conflict and may provide valuable insight to a diaspora program in developing consensus and forming recommendations on how to proceed. However, groups specializing in capacity transfer to the Tamils in Sri Lanka often come under intense scrutiny from the Sri Lankan government as potential funders and resource providers for the LTTE.

The Tamil diaspora has played a significant role in the Sri Lankan conflict, serving as an overseas voice for Tamil grievances in Sri Lanka and actively promoting the development of a political solution. Many in the Tamil diaspora, both willingly and unwillingly, have also played a role in funding and politically supporting the efforts of the LTTE.¹⁷³ The strength of the Tamil diaspora may both facilitate and present challenges to a diaspora engagement program. Given the interconnected nature of the Tamil diaspora, the results of a diaspora engagement program may have a significant impact on the conflict by changing the perspectives of the diaspora on the conflict or providing an incentive for further engagement. However, the strength of the Tamil diaspora community may also present barriers for sections of the Tamil diaspora to feel comfortable expressing

¹⁶⁹ A.J.V. Chandrakanthan, *Eelam Tamil Nationalism: An Inside View*, in SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM 157, 172 (A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, 2000).

¹⁷⁰ See Tamil Cultural Association at the University of Texas at Austin, *available at* <http://studentorgs.utexas.edu/tamilsa/>; University of Windsor Tamil Students' Association, *available at* <http://web2.uwindsor.ca/courses/clubs/tsa/index.htm>; Carleton University Tamil Student's Association, *available at* <http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=2248355748>.

¹⁷¹ Medical Institute for Tamils, *Medical Humanitarian Mission in Progress*, (2004), *available at* http://www.tamildoctors.org/funds/project_03.shtml.

¹⁷² Medical Institute for Tamils, *Medical Humanitarian Mission in Progress*, (2004), *available at* http://www.tamildoctors.org/funds/project_03.shtml.

¹⁷³ C. Christine Fair, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT, PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 172, 174 (Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., 2007).

alternative opinions to the conflict and potential strategies for its resolution. Such barriers may have a detrimental effect on a diaspora engagement program.

The Sinhalese Diaspora

While the Sinhalese constitute the majority of the population in Sri Lanka, the Tamil diaspora community far outnumbers the Sinhalese diaspora community, which constitutes less than ten percent of the Sri Lankan diaspora.¹⁷⁴ Prior to 1983, the Sinhalese immigrated to work or study in western states.¹⁷⁵ They provided the foundation for the Sinhalese diaspora, working with the Tamils in joint diaspora communities and organizations.¹⁷⁶ By contrast, many current members of the Sinhalese diaspora leave Sri Lanka as temporary guest workers and work primarily in the Middle East.¹⁷⁷ Although these guest workers do play an important role in sustaining the Sri Lankan economy through remittances, they tend to not become very politically engaged while overseas. Such lack of political engagement can be attributed in part to that fact that guest workers' leave from Sri Lanka is short, and they tend to interact less with the established diaspora communities. As a result, guest workers often are more difficult to engage in diaspora activities.¹⁷⁸

The Sinhalese diaspora in the West is predominantly composed of educated and affluent individuals who are well connected and capable of effectively lobbying host-state governments.¹⁷⁹ The Sinhalese diaspora is typically closely connected to the Sri Lankan government through the Sri Lankan embassies. As a result, the Sinhalese diaspora is often organized through embassy-led and government-initiated projects rather than by independent Sinhalese diaspora

¹⁷⁴ Oxfam GB, FOREIGN TERRITORY, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF EU ASYLUM POLICY 94 (2005).

¹⁷⁵ Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case* 13, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

¹⁷⁶ Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, *Tamil Diaspora Politics*, in *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS* 493, 495 (Melvin Ember, et al, eds, 2004), available at www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/060209sriskandarajah.pdf.

¹⁷⁷ Bahar Baser, Mirella Pejic, *Diaspora and their Involvement in Peace Processes: Conference Report June 2007* 38 (2007) (remarks of Camilla Orjuela at a conference held at Uppsala University in Sweden), available at .

¹⁷⁸ Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case* 13, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

¹⁷⁹ Dushy Ranetunge, *Prabhakaran's Charity: Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)*, SRI LANKA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20071127_09.

organizations.¹⁸⁰ These programs include calls for financial support and political lobbying or efforts to reach out to the Tamil diaspora.¹⁸¹ The Sinhalese diaspora community often seeks political support from its host-states in combating the LTTE and opposing the Tamils' demand for an independent state within Sri Lanka.¹⁸²

The primary focus of the Sinhalese diaspora is on discrete activities aimed at addressing the needs of the Sri Lankan government in the conflict. Sinhalese individuals and small groups within the diaspora act in response to the needs of the conflict rather than in diaspora-wide movements.¹⁸³ As a result, the Sri Lankan government has mobilized the Sinhalese diaspora into a diaspora-wide network by periodically calling on the Sinhalese diaspora to provide political and financial support to the government and to monitor the actions of the Tamil diaspora.

The Sinhalese diaspora has monitored or investigated members of the Tamil diaspora suspected of financially contributing to the LTTE. In response to the Central Bank bombing in Colombo in 1996, a small group of Sinhalese in London undertook an effort to find the British charity that funneled money to the LTTE.¹⁸⁴ With research and outreach through a quarterly publication on Sri Lanka from a Sinhalese point of view, the small group learned the identity of the Tamil diaspora members supporting the LTTE.¹⁸⁵ In the United States, the proscription

¹⁸⁰ Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case* 14, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

¹⁸¹ Daya Gamage, *Sri Lanka Embassy in U.S. Wants Dialogue with Lankan Groups*, ASIAN TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2006), available at http://www.asiantribune.com/oldsite/show_news.php?id=17413; Asian Tribune, *Sri Lanka Ambassador in Germany on a Reaching Out Program*, (Aug. 8, 2008), available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/12636>; Asian Tribune, *Sri Lankans in Italy to Help the Soldiers and Help the Internally Displaced Tamils in the Northern Province*, (Jan. 6, 2009), available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/15024>.

¹⁸² Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case*, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

¹⁸³ Dushy Ranetunge, *Prabhakaran's charity: Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)*, SRI LANKA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, PUBLIC SECURITY, LAW & ORDER, (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20071127_09.

¹⁸⁴ Dushy Ranetunge, *Prabhakaran's charity: Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)*, SRI LANKA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, PUBLIC SECURITY, LAW & ORDER, (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20071127_09.

¹⁸⁵ Dushy Ranetunge, *Prabhakaran's charity: Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)*, SRI LANKA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, PUBLIC SECURITY, LAW & ORDER, (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20071127_09.

of the LTTE as a terrorist organization is attributed mainly to the efforts of Sinhalese, pro-Sri Lankan government groups on the east coast.¹⁸⁶ Following the success of these efforts, the Government of Sri Lanka called on the Sinhalese diaspora to monitor the activities of the Tamil diaspora in their host states to halt the flow of funding from the Tamil diaspora to the LTTE through a series of news alerts underscoring the problem of diaspora funding the LTTE's operations.¹⁸⁷ The reactive nature of the Sinhalese diaspora presents a challenge in designing programs to engage them, as there is no overarching Sinhalese diaspora organization capable of disseminating information about or supporting a diaspora engagement program.

In addition, the Sinhalese diaspora often organizes to financially support the Sri Lankan military¹⁸⁸ and state development.¹⁸⁹ Just as the Tamil diaspora lobbies host-state governments to take action regarding Tamil grievances, the Sinhalese diaspora lobbies host-state governments to raise awareness of the LTTE's activities and to identify LTTE donors residing in the host-state.¹⁹⁰

The Sinhalese diaspora communities are organized on a small scale in comparison to the Tamil diaspora. However, in response to the actions of the Tamil diaspora and LTTE violence within Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese diaspora has effectively lobbied host-state governments to ban certain Tamil organizations and to prevent certain fundraising efforts of the Tamil diaspora. Because the Sinhalese diaspora is typically mobilized by the Sri Lankan government, engaging the diaspora may be challenging as there is no civil society network or prominent diaspora organization capable of disseminating information throughout the diaspora. Further, engaging the Sri Lankan government in a diaspora program has implications for the participation of other diaspora groups. As such, engaging the Sinhalese diaspora requires careful consideration of the available methods to ensure the program adequately reflects the opinions and concerns of the Sinhalese diaspora and is not a voice of the Sri Lankan government.

¹⁸⁶ Kenneth Abeywickrama, *On Sri Lanka's Failed Foreign Policy*, ASIAN TRIBUNE (Feb. 10, 2008), available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/9541>.

¹⁸⁷ Dushy Ranetunge, *Prabhakaran's charity: Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)*, SRI LANKA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, PUBLIC SECURITY, LAW & ORDER, (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20071127_09.

¹⁸⁸ Australian Tamil, *Sri Lanka Military Seeks Funds From Sinhala Diaspora*, (May 10, 2008), available at <http://australiantamil.com/?p=1300>.

¹⁸⁹ *S. Lanka Targets \$500 million from Diaspora for Development*, REUTERS INDIA, Feb. 2, 2009, available at <http://in.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idINCOL41567920090202?rpc=401&=undefined&sp=true>.

¹⁹⁰ Dushy Ranetunge, *Prabhakaran's charity: Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)*, SRI LANKA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, PUBLIC SECURITY, LAW & ORDER, (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20071127_09.

The Muslim Diaspora and Other Sri Lankan Diaspora Communities

The Sri Lankan Muslim diaspora is a smaller and far less politically active Sri Lankan diaspora community than the Tamil or Sinhalese diaspora. Sri Lankan Muslims, who include Moors and Malay Muslims, compose approximately seven percent of Sri Lanka's population¹⁹¹ and comprise a third of the population in the conflict area.¹⁹² The Sri Lankan Muslim population has suffered significant displacement as a result of the conflict.¹⁹³ However, only very small numbers of Sri Lankan Muslims have immigrated. Rather than leaving the island, the Sri Lankan Muslim population has generally moved within Sri Lanka.¹⁹⁴ When Muslims have left Sri Lanka, they have primarily traveled to Malaysia and Australia. As victims of violence perpetrated by both the Sinhalese and Tamils, the Muslims have a significant interest in a political solution to the conflict.¹⁹⁵

The Sri Lankan Muslim diaspora and other diaspora communities do not generally engage in programs focused on the Sri Lankan conflict to the same degree as the Tamil or Sinhalese diaspora communities.¹⁹⁶ For the Muslim diaspora, this is in part due to their identification with a greater Muslim diaspora rather than a smaller Sri Lankan Muslim diaspora,¹⁹⁷ as well as their minimal emigration from Sri Lanka.¹⁹⁸ While the Sri Lankan Muslim diaspora are not actively engaged in the conflict, the community has a strong interest in resolving the conflict. This interest is evidenced in the Sri Lankan Muslim diaspora's

¹⁹¹ U.S. Department of State, *Sri Lanka Background Notes* (Sept. 2008), available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm>.

¹⁹² Dennis B. McGilvray and Mirak Raheem, *Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict*, EAST-WEST CENTER WASHINGTON vii (2007), available at www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/ps041.pdf.

¹⁹³ International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka's Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire*, (May 2007), available at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4868.

¹⁹⁴ Kamalika Pieris, *The Muslims and Sri Lanka*, MISSION ISLAM, available at <http://www.missionislam.com/knowledge/srilanka.htm>.

¹⁹⁵ Dennis B. McGilvray and Mirak Raheem, *Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict*, EAST-WEST CENTER WASHINGTON vii (2007), available at www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/ps041.pdf.

¹⁹⁶ Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case 12*, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1

¹⁹⁷ Camilla Orjuela, *Diaspora Identities and Homeland Politics, Lessons from the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam Case 12*, ISA Annual Convention (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=a41d54991091c2f5decc5ff1c9a217e1.

¹⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka's Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire*, (May 2007), available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4868>.

involvement in programs and consultations upon the invitation of host-state governments or of Tamil and Singhalese diaspora groups. Through these programs, the Muslim diaspora has expressed concerns that Muslim interests have yet to be factored into a political solution to the conflict.¹⁹⁹ In a diaspora engagement program, the inclusion of the Muslim diaspora may provide a useful third-party perspective to the conflict and assure the Sri Lankan Muslims that any recommendations presented to the parties of the peace process for inclusion in a political agreement would represent their interests.

While the smaller Sri Lankan diaspora groups have experienced the effects of the conflict, their involvement in the creation of a political solution is much more limited than the Tamil, Singhalese, or Muslim diaspora groups. Burgher involvement in the peace process has been limited to dialogue with other diaspora groups in diaspora-initiated or third-party initiated conferences and programs. Following the 2004 tsunami, the Burgher diaspora contributed significantly to reconstruction efforts of the Burgher communities destroyed in Batticaloa.²⁰⁰ Although the Burghers have not played a significant role in the Sri Lankan diaspora with respect to the conflict, their involvement in tsunami rehabilitation suggests that they have an interest in the welfare of the Burghers who remained in Sri Lanka and may be interested in engaging with the diaspora community to advocate for recognition of those interests.

Inter-Ethnic Diaspora Affiliations

In addition, a small number of diaspora affiliations cut across ethnic lines. For instance, Christian, specifically Roman Catholic Tamils and Singhalese, constitute a small portion of the Sri Lankan diaspora. The Sri Lankan American Catholic Association (SLACA) of Metropolitan Washington provides the Catholic Sri Lankan diaspora with a structure for charitable giving and a forum for discussion of issues that affect the interests of the community.²⁰¹ However, due to strong sentiments of ethnic nationalism tied to religious beliefs in Sri Lanka, engaging the diaspora communities across religious lines may be difficult. Singhalese who align themselves with the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and People's Liberation Front (JVP) political parties may strongly oppose incorporating the Sri Lankan Catholic diaspora due to existing tensions between

¹⁹⁹ International Network of Sri Lankan Diaspora, available at <http://srilankandiasporablog.wordpress.com/insd/>.

²⁰⁰ Ethirajan Anbarasan, *Tsunami Unites Sri Lanka Burghers*, BBC NEWS, Mar. 27, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4381811.stm.

²⁰¹ Sri Lankan American Catholic Association of Metropolitan Washington, *Welcome to Our Homepage!*, (2005), available at <http://www.slacamw.org/>.

Buddhist nationalists and Catholic groups in Sri Lanka.²⁰² Therefore, although inter-ethnic diaspora affiliations typically provide space for dialogue within the diaspora across ethnic groups, inclusion of the Catholic diaspora through such organizations as the SLACA may result in disenfranchising key groups from participating in a successful diaspora engagement program.

²⁰² Doug Bandow, *Buddhist Supremacy, Thailand Should Not Follow Sri Lanka's Lead in Sanctifying a State Religion*, THE BUDDHIST CHANNEL, (Aug. 1, 2007), available at <http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=8,4702,0,0,1,0>.

Annex B: Prior Programs to Engage the Sri Lankan Diaspora Community

The Sri Lankan diaspora has participated in a number of programs intended to encourage the diaspora to consider their interests in the conflict and to facilitate a political settlement. This annex provides a brief synopsis of past Sri Lankan diaspora engagement programs.

Federation of Sri Lankan Associations in Malaysia (FOMSO)

In August of 2008, the Federation of Sri Lankan Associations in Malaysia (FOMSO), in collaboration with the Department of Indian Studies of the University of Malaya, sponsored a three-day conference entitled “International Conference on the Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward.”²⁰³ FOMSO formed in 2003 as an umbrella organization of twenty-five Sri Lankan organizations in Malaysia,²⁰⁴ including both Singhalese and Tamil organizations.²⁰⁵

To distribute information about the conference, FOMSO created a page on their website and contacted Sri Lankan diaspora organizations. An organizing committee of four individuals and five subcommittees worked to develop the Conference.²⁰⁶ The five subcommittees included a committee for programming, cultural events, social events, and logistics.²⁰⁷ The Conference was called to address concerns with the diaspora community, coordinate their skills for the benefit of the diaspora, and promote the creation of further opportunities to collaborate.²⁰⁸

²⁰³ A diaspora engagement program may utilize FOMSO’s membership, organizations that include cultural, athletic, financial organizations, to disseminate information and as a source of information on creating a diaspora-wide conference. FOMSO Federation of Malaysia Sri Lankan Organisations, *International Conference on the Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, (2008), available at <http://www.fomso.org/conf1.htm>; Sri Lanka Flyer, *Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, TAMILNATION, available at http://www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/articles/kl_flyer.pdf.

²⁰⁴ FOMSO Federation of Malaysian Sri Lankan Organisations, *President’s Message*, (2008), available at <http://www.fomso.org/>.

²⁰⁵ FOMSO Federation of Malaysia Sri Lankan Organisations, *Membership*, (2008), available at <http://www.fomso.org/member.htm>.

²⁰⁶ Sri Lanka Flyer, *Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, TAMILNATION, available at http://www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/articles/kl_flyer.pdf.

²⁰⁷ Sri Lanka Flyer, *Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, TAMILNATION, available at http://www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/articles/kl_flyer.pdf.

²⁰⁸ FOMSO Federation of Malaysia Sri Lankan Organisations, *International Conference on the Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, (2008), available at <http://www.fomso.org/conf1.htm>

The FOMSO conference included plenary sessions, symposiums, workshops, and a summary forum.²⁰⁹ Through plenary sessions, the conference addressed general issues pertaining to the diaspora, examining the evolution of the diaspora, the impact of the conflict on the diaspora, and the impact of the diaspora on host states.²¹⁰ Through smaller sessions, the conference addressed specific issues regarding the diaspora community in their host states, including the protection of women's rights and an examination of the successes and failures of the diaspora in host states.²¹¹ Speakers consisted of prominent Sri Lankans and members of the Sri Lankan diaspora from Norway, Germany, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Canada, Denmark, and the United States.²¹²

The FOMSO conference illustrated the political difficulties of organizing a conference of the Sri Lankan diaspora. TamilNation and TamilNet, two popular Tamil diaspora websites, published critical commentaries of the conference, arguing that the conference had failed to adequately include all interested parties in the Sri Lankan diaspora.²¹³ TamilNation and TamilNet expressed concerns that the Sri Lankan diaspora was not prepared to recognize the Tamils and instead sought to assimilate the Tamils rather than recognize their interests in resolving the conflict.²¹⁴ In addition, TamilNet suggested that through the conference the organizers sought to intimidate portions of the diaspora.²¹⁵ The experiences of the FOMSO conference indicate the activeness of Tamil media organizations and the potential criticism any diaspora engagement program may publicly receive from the media.

²⁰⁹ FOMSO Federation of Malaysia Sri Lankan Organisations, *International Conference on the Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, (2008), available at <http://www.fomso.org/conf1.htm>

²¹⁰ Sri Lanka Flyer, *Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, TAMILNATION, available at http://www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/articles/kl_flyer.pdf.

²¹¹ Sri Lanka Flyer, *Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, TAMILNATION, available at http://www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/articles/kl_flyer.pdf.

²¹² Participants included: Professor P. Ragupathy (Norway), Prof. Dagmar Hellman (Germany), Dr. Vitaj Mendis (Germany), Dr. Khoo Khay Khim (Malaysia), Professor K. Inthrapala (Australia), Dr. Murugar Gunasingam (Australia), Prof. V. Nithyandandam (New Zealand), Mr. Visahan Suberamaniam (London), Mr. Anton Ravindran (Singapore), Professor S. Sathia Seelan (Sri Lanka), Professor Chitralekha Maunaguru (Sri Lanka), Associate Professor R. Cheran (Canada), Professor Rajah Rasiah (Malaysia), Dr. D.M. Thuraiappah (Malaysia), Mr. V. Srikathirgamanathan (Denmark), Mr. Jay Jeyathesan (London), Dr. A.R. Mohammed Imtiaz (United States), Mr. Mariampillai Selvin Ireneus (Germany), Prof. A Sanmugadas (Sri Lanka), Dr. G.K. Ananda Kumaraseri (Malaysia), and Mr. Vijaya Samarawickrama (Malaysia). Sri Lanka Flyer, *Sri Lankan Diaspora – The Way Forward*, TAMILNATION, available at http://www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/articles/kl_flyer.pdf.

²¹³ Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA, *On the 'Sri Lankan Diaspora' Conference in Kuala Lumpur*, (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.sangam.org/2008/09/Diaspora_Conference.php?uid=3076.

²¹⁴ Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA, *On the 'Sri Lankan Diaspora' Conference in Kuala Lumpur*, (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.sangam.org/2008/09/Diaspora_Conference.php?uid=3076.

²¹⁵ TamilNet, *"It Is Now the Tamil Diaspora,"* (Sept. 6, 2008), available at <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=26851>.

International Alert

International Alert's BIZPACT program engages and connects members of the Sri Lankan diaspora business community to create and invest in projects that promote regional stability in Sri Lanka. The program maintains a special focus on "ameliorating social problems and [the] widening regional social disparities in access to resources, employment and education."²¹⁶ International Alert works with Chambers of Commerce, the UK-Sri Lanka Business Council, and various business associations to connect members of the diaspora. The program efforts began with the Sri Lankan diaspora in Australia and have expanded to the United Kingdom. In addition to bringing together members of the Sri Lankan diaspora, International Alert has included local Sri Lankans in the process, bringing them to meetings with the diaspora overseas to discuss and provide input into potential future projects.

The BIZPACT program is structured around two components: tangible outputs and dialogue. The tangible outputs portion consists of business initiatives established by members of the Sri Lankan diaspora community. An example of such an initiative is the recent establishment of a rice mill company in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. The company, called *Sitamu*, has Singhalese, Tamil, and Muslim owners. Having representatives of each major community as owners in the company helps ensure proper treatment of its workers, increased access to employment opportunities for all three communities, and prevents discrimination from interfering in the proper functioning of the company.

The dialogue component of the program will take place over the long term as a result of the business initiatives. The business initiatives have forged relationships that cut across the ethnic, religious, and social divides. Through its BIZPACT program, International Alert hopes to bridge intra- and inter-ethnic divides in the Sri Lankan diaspora and as a result, help "diffuse ethnic militancy both abroad and at home."²¹⁷

²¹⁶ International Alert Website, *Sri Lanka: Supporting the Private Sector Role in Peacebuilding*, available at http://www.international-alert.org/sri_lanka/index.php?t=1.

²¹⁷ International Alert Website, *Sri Lanka: Supporting the Private Sector Role in Peacebuilding*, available at http://www.international-alert.org/sri_lanka/index.php?t=1.

International Network of Sri Lankan Diaspora (INSD)

The International Network of Sri Lankan Diaspora (INSD) in Norway hosted a conference in May 2008 entitled “Conference on International Diaspora Respond to Sri Lankan Current Situation.”²¹⁸ The INSD is a European diaspora organization created to develop solutions to the conflict.²¹⁹ Participants included Tamils, Singhalese, Muslims, and Burghers from Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, and the Netherlands.²²⁰ The three-day conference in Norway combined the German and Norwegian INSD organizations and featured presentations on the conflict, the future of the peace process, devolution of power, and the human rights situation, as well as information on lobbying and contributing to peace from within the diaspora.²²¹ The participants created a six-point resolution that included points on resuming peace talks, urging respect for human rights, encouraging the government to recognize the rights of minority groups living in Sri Lanka, calling for a political solution, and appealing for the protection of the media.²²² The resolution has not been publicly commented on or implemented by the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE, or the Tamil diaspora.

A similar regional diaspora-wide conference was held in Berlin in October 2008. The three-day conference, also sponsored by INSD, examined the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, the problems of corruption and nepotism in Sri Lanka, and the experiences of international NGOs working in Sri Lanka.²²³ In addition to panel discussions, the conference included working groups on how to improve the cooperation among the diaspora and host state governments and NGOs. The conference allowed participation from members of the diaspora as well as

²¹⁸ International Network of Sri Lankan Diaspora, *Conference on International Diaspora Respond to Sri Lankan Situation*, (May 6, 2008), available at <http://www.insdnorway.com/2008/05/conference-on-international-diaspora.html>.

²¹⁹ See International Network of Sri Lankan Diaspora, available at <http://srilankandiasporablog.wordpress.com/insd/>.

²²⁰ Free Media and INSD, *Press Release: Resolution of Conference on International Diaspora Respond to Sri Lankan Current Situation*, (May 2008), available at http://shots.snap.com/explore/22669/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsrilankandiasporablog.files.wordpress.com%2F2008%2F06%2Fresolution-insd.pdf&key=e5a3c1e6dff5de35b1c6e7c470411886&src=pub-2311827-www.wordpress.com&cp=&tol=url_arrow.

²²¹ International Network of Sri Lankan Diaspora, *Conference on International Diaspora Respond to Sri Lankan Situation*, (May 6, 2008), available at <http://www.insdnorway.com/2008/05/conference-on-international-diaspora.html>.

²²² Free Media and INSD, *Press Release: Resolution of Conference on International Diaspora Respond to Sri Lankan Current Situation*, (May 2008), available at http://shots.snap.com/explore/22669/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsrilankandiasporablog.files.wordpress.com%2F2008%2F06%2Fresolution-insd.pdf&key=e5a3c1e6dff5de35b1c6e7c470411886&src=pub-2311827-www.wordpress.com&cp=&tol=url_arrow.

²²³ Sri Lanka: Is War the Only Solution to the Conflict?, Conference Invitation, available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/6378073/Diaspora-Meeting-Invitation-2008>.

nonmembers who had an interest in discussing the Sri Lankan conflict.²²⁴

Following the conference, the participants resolved to “stop the inhuman war immediately and resume peace talks,” “stop harassment, arrests, disappearances and murders,” “stop indiscriminate attacks and bombing of civilian targets,” and recognize “that economic prosperity and social harmony can be attained for all in Sri Lanka only if there is a just political solution through power-sharing.”²²⁵ The involvement of prominent diaspora members as well as representatives of the international NGO community and host-state governments underscored the connection between the diaspora and the host state.²²⁶ The participants also discussed methods for cooperation among the diaspora, host-state governments, and NGOs.²²⁷ To date, it is unclear how the program has impacted its intended goals.

Latrobe University

In 2008, Latrobe University in Australia sponsored a diaspora program, engaging thirty to forty members from the Singhalese, Tamil, Muslim, and Burgher diasporas in a six-session dialogue.²²⁸ The organizers of the conference created guiding principles and methods to successfully engage the diaspora.²²⁹ These principles and methods included entering into respectful communication with all parties to the program, and recognizing the value of diversity.²³⁰ In addition, the conference provided that the statements would remain anonymous, permitting the participants to speak candidly without fear of repercussion for their remarks.²³¹ The conference produced a joint statement that encouraged cooperation among the Sri Lankan diaspora communities in Australia as well as a

²²⁴ Sri Lanka: Is War the Only Solution to the Conflict?, Conference Invitation, available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/6378073/Diaspora-Meeting-Invitation-2008>.

²²⁵ *Berlin Conference on Sri Lankan Turmoil*, CONFLUENCE, Jan. 29, 2009, available at <http://www.confluence.org.uk/2009/01/29/berlin-conference-on-sri-lankan-turmoil/>.

²²⁶ *Berlin Conference on Sri Lankan Turmoil*, CONFLUENCE, Jan. 29, 2009, available at <http://www.confluence.org.uk/2009/01/29/berlin-conference-on-sri-lankan-turmoil/>.

²²⁷ Sri Lanka: Is War the Only Solution to the Conflict?, Conference Invitation, available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/6378073/Diaspora-Meeting-Invitation-2008>.

²²⁸ Center for Dialogue, *Dialogue Diaspora*, LA TROBE UNIVERSITY (Dec. 18, 2008), available at <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/dialogue/projects/dialogue-diaspora.html>.

²²⁹ Latrobe University, *Dialogue Diaspora, Principles, Methods, and Process*, available at <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/dialogue/projects/dialogue-diaspora.html>.

²³⁰ Center for Dialogue, *Dialogue Diaspora: Principles, Methods, and Process*, LA TROBE UNIVERSITY (Dec. 18, 2008), available at <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/dialogue/projects/dialogue-diaspora.html>.

²³¹ Center for Dialogue, *Dialogue Diaspora: Principles, Methods, and Process*, LA TROBE UNIVERSITY (Dec. 18, 2008), available at <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/dialogue/projects/dialogue-diaspora.html>.

call to Sri Lanka to promote “a culture of peace based on mutual respect, mutual understanding and cooperation.”²³²

Alliance for Peace and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (APRSL)

On January 25, 2009, a group of Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese gathered in London to bring “all the communities in Sri Lanka together for nation building and restoration of peace, democracy, and rule of law,” and formed the Alliance for Peace and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (APRSL).²³³ APRSL, composed of a fifteen-member Executive Committee and sub-committees, aims to provide support and advice on the resolution of the conflict.²³⁴ APRSL’s mission calls on the diaspora to campaign internationally, address issues that affect Sri Lankans in and outside of Sri Lanka, “educate, motivate and harness youth in the diaspora to become involved in the conflict resolution process,” strengthen structures that connect the diaspora, and raise global awareness of the conflict in Sri Lanka.²³⁵

Sri Lankan Democracy Forum

As the military conflict continued to escalate in late 2008 and early 2009, humanitarian concerns drew the Sri Lankan diaspora community together to call for the protection of Tamil civilians in the north and east of Sri Lanka. On January 29, 2009, ten Sri Lankan diaspora organizations representing both the Sinhalese and Tamil diasporas, signed a joint statement calling for the protections of civilians trapped in the town of Mullaitivu.²³⁶ Brought together by the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum, these organizations represent members of the global diaspora.²³⁷ Citing a statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross

²³² Center for Dialogue, *Dialogue Diaspora*, LA TROBE UNIVERSITY (Dec. 18, 2008), available at <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/dialogue/projects/dialogue-diaspora.html>.

²³³ Sri Lanka Guardian, *Alliance for Peace and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (APRSL)*, (Jan. 31, 2009), available at <http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/01/alliance-for-peace-and-reconciliation.html>.

²³⁴ Sri Lanka Guardian, *Alliance for Peace and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (APRSL)*, (Jan. 31, 2009), available at <http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/01/alliance-for-peace-and-reconciliation.html>.

²³⁵ Sri Lanka Guardian, *Alliance for Peace and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (APRSL)*, (Jan. 31, 2009), available at <http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/01/alliance-for-peace-and-reconciliation.html>.

²³⁶ These organizations included: Sri Lanka Democracy Forum, International Network of Sri Lankan Diaspora, Committee for Democracy and Justice, Thenee- Tamil Website, Uthayam Magazine, Uyirmilal, South Asia Solidarity Group, Free Media, and South Asia Solidarity Initiative. *Sri Lanka: Diaspora Organizations Demand GOSL and LTTE Act Immediately to Prevent Humanitarian Catastrophe*, SRI LANKA DEMOCRACY FORUM, Jan. 30, 2009, available at <http://www.sacw.net/article563.html>.

²³⁷ Signatories included: SLDF, the Sri Lanka Islamic Forum (SLIF), the Dalit Social Development Front, INSD, the Sri Lanka Association, the Committee for Democracy and Justice, the Canadian Democratic League, the Sri Lanka Circle, Thenee - Tamil Website, Uthayam Newspaper, Vaikarai Newspaper, Parai Magazine, Uyirnizhal - A Tamil Political Literary Magazine, Uyirmei - A Tamil Political Literary Magazine, the South Asia Solidarity Group, Free Media, the South Asia Solidarity Initiative (SASI). *Diaspora Organizations Demand GOSL and LTTE Act*

(ICRC), the statement called for the LTTE to stop using civilians as human shields and for the Government of Sri Lanka to uphold its responsibility to protect civilians trapped in the conflict zone.²³⁸ The statement also called for international actors to pressure both parties to protect the rights of citizens in the conflict zone.²³⁹

Sri Lankan Embassy Initiatives

In March 2006, the Sri Lankan Embassy in Washington, D.C., initiated a “Reaching Out Program” inviting all diaspora communities to contact the Embassy and through the Embassy reach each other.²⁴⁰ The program, organized by Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke, asked all “Sri Lankan and Sri Lankan related groups” in the United States to contact the embassy and provide information about their organization.²⁴¹ Further, the Ambassador invited “individual Sri Lankans or friends of Sri Lanka, who wish to be involved in Sri Lanka related activities” to send their information.²⁴² Similarly, in 2008, the Sri Lankan Ambassador in Germany created a “Reaching Out Program” in which he visited with Tamil organizations within Germany.²⁴³ The Ambassador visited the cities of Bielefeld and Hamm where he met and informed the Tamil community of the Sri Lankan government’s development programs in the eastern region of Sri Lanka.²⁴⁴

Volunteer Service Overseas (VSO)

The British service organization Volunteer Service Overseas (VSO) has sponsored a program that connects members of the Sri Lankan diaspora

Immediately to Prevent Humanitarian Catastrophe, SRI LANKA GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2009, available at <http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/01/diaspora-organizations-demand-gosl-and.html>.

²³⁸ *Sri Lanka: Diaspora Organizations Demand GOSL and LTTE Act Immediately to Prevent Humanitarian Catastrophe*, SRI LANKA DEMOCRACY FORUM, Jan. 30, 2009, available at <http://www.sacw.net/article563.html>.

²³⁹ International Network of Sri Lankan Diaspora, *Diaspora Organizations Demand GOSL and LTTE Act Immediately to Prevent Humanitarian Catastrophe: Safety of Civilians in Mullaitivu is Priority*, (Jan. 29, 2009), available at <http://www.srilankandiaspora.com/MyPosts/English/English/Safety-of-Civilians-in-Mullaitivu-is-Priority-129.php>.

²⁴⁰ Daya Gamage, *Sri Lanka Embassy in U.S. Wants Dialogue with Lankan Groups*, ASIAN TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2006), available at http://www.asiantribune.com/oldsite/show_news.php?id=17413.

²⁴¹ Daya Gamage, *Sri Lanka Embassy in U.S. Wants Dialogue with Lankan Groups*, ASIAN TRIBUNE, (Mar. 24, 2006), available at http://www.asiantribune.com/oldsite/show_news.php?id=17413.

²⁴² Daya Gamage, *Sri Lanka Embassy in U.S. Wants Dialogue with Lankan Groups*, ASIAN TRIBUNE, (Mar. 24, 2006), available at http://www.asiantribune.com/oldsite/show_news.php?id=17413.

²⁴³ Asian Tribune, *Sri Lanka Ambassador in Germany on a Reaching Out Program*, (Aug. 8, 2008), available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/12636>.

²⁴⁴ Asian Tribune, *Sri Lanka Ambassador in Germany on a Reaching Out Program*, (Aug. 8, 2008), available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/12636>.

community with Sri Lanka through volunteer programs.²⁴⁵ VSO locates and recruits volunteers to provide mental health and disability assistance as well as training in participation and governance to those in Sri Lanka, thereby building capacity of the home state.²⁴⁶ VSO actively recruits diaspora members who have “business, project management, and strategic planning skills,” in conjunction with or separate from skills related to the three above-listed areas of service.²⁴⁷

Understanding previous attempts at formally engaging the Sri Lankan diaspora will be a good starting point for establishing goals and guidelines when designing future diaspora engagement programs. Reviewing the experiences of past Sri Lankan diaspora programs can provide insight into their successes and shortcomings, as well as ideas regarding potential collaborators, facilitators, and consultants.

²⁴⁵ VSO, *Diaspora Volunteering* (2009), available at http://www.vso.org.uk/about/diaspora_volunteering/.

²⁴⁶ VSO, *Diaspora Volunteering* (2009), available at http://www.vso.org.uk/about/diaspora_volunteering/.

²⁴⁷ VSO, *Diaspora Volunteering* (2009), available at http://www.vso.org.uk/about/diaspora_volunteering/.

Annex C: Program Recommendations

The prior involvement of the Sri Lankan diaspora in engagement programs and peace initiatives and the quickly evolving military and humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka may impact the implementation of a diaspora program. Based on the past experiences and best practices of the Sri Lankan diaspora and of other diaspora programs, program implementers would benefit from defining goals for the program, maintaining flexibility in implementing the program, ensuring that all participants in the program participate freely without fear of being targeted or investigated for their participation, and maintaining neutrality and confidentiality throughout the process to encourage the production of an effective program report and recommendations for parties engaged in peace processes.

Establishing Goals

Establishing goals at the outset is a crucial component of any successful diaspora program. The program goals will inform the structure of the program, the selection of participants, the agenda, the issues to be discussed, and the work of the facilitators. Goals may be short- or long-term and may include encouraging dialogue among diaspora communities, articulating points of consensus among diaspora communities, and/or producing a joint statement or agreement on the topic discussed. George Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) Ethiopian Extended Dialogue established a clear goal of using sustained dialogues to "address [the] protracted social conflict, rebuild relationships, and to 'change conflictual relationships over time.'"²⁴⁸ ICAR stressed that the goal of the program was not to serve as peace negotiations or to draft an official peace agreement among the parties, but rather to bring together a diverse group of members from the Ethiopian diaspora community that encouraged open discussion of pressing issues in the conflict free from criticism or intimidation.²⁴⁹

Establishing goals for implementing a program in Sri Lanka is particularly challenging considering that neither the Tamil or Singhalese diaspora communities are homogenous in viewpoint. Program implementers may need to consult a diversity of groups to establish goals, which may involve encouraging dialogue among each community and then across the diaspora communities. Short-term goals for a Sri Lanka diaspora engagement program could include productive

²⁴⁸ Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003, 7 (2004).

²⁴⁹ Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003, 7 (2004).

debate and discussion, the development of a platform of issues of mutual interest, or the development of statements pertaining to issues ancillary to the peace process, such as economic investment and development initiatives or capacity and knowledge transfer from members of the diaspora to their home state. Long-term goals may include the production of a joint statement on the peace process, further diaspora engagement, and combined pressure on the Government of Sri Lanka and host state governments to move forward with the peace process.

Further, goals may be established for both the program as a whole and for program facilitators. Establishing overall program goals allows the participants to assume ownership of the program, increasing their commitment to the program and its end results. Establishing goals for program facilitators allows facilitators to maintain a focus while flexibly adapting to the needs of the diaspora communities in engaging in dialogue. A Somali diaspora program in Denmark organized by three Somali organizations (the Homestead, the National, and the Horn) brought together members of the Danish Somali diaspora to discuss potential development initiatives in Somalia through capacity transfer and financial investment. Throughout the program, participants were encouraged not to discuss clan identities and relations, a prominent underlying cause of the conflict. Organizers of the program agreed to focus on the limited goal of addressing Somalia development initiatives, with the understanding that clan identities and relations would necessarily need to be addressed in further diaspora interaction.²⁵⁰

While the facilitators and the participants in a Sri Lankan diaspora engagement program may share the overall goals of the program, it may be useful for facilitators to also identify and pursue informal goals, including developing areas of consensus for the diaspora and encouraging future and continued diaspora dialogue. These informal goals will allow the facilitators to assess their progress in facilitating the program, as well as the program's overall impact. Facilitators would benefit from anticipating possible changes in the conflict that could result in changes to both the overall goals of the program as well as the informal goals. All goals of the program will need to be consistently reevaluated to ascertain their continued relevance to the current political developments in the conflict and, if necessary, altered to ensure maximum impact of the diaspora engagement program on a peace process.

²⁵⁰ See Nauja Kleist, *Mobilising 'The Diaspora': Somali Transnational Political Engagement*, 34 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 307, 314 (2008) (noting that one of the organizers referred to clan connections as "a bridge we need to cross").

Ensuring Unimpeded Participation of All Diaspora Community Members

To produce a meaningful outcome, a diaspora program should include members from each diaspora community. In PILPG's Darfur Leaders Network (DLN) program, the DLN worked with Save Darfur and PILPG to carefully select and invite participants resulting in as many as twenty-eight Darfuri groups being represented in the two-day dialogue and negotiation training sessions of the program held in Washington, DC, New York, London, Paris, and Brussels. Careful and inclusive selection of participants is of critical importance to the success or failure of a diaspora engagement program, as participant selection determines how representative the program is and builds support for the program's outcome. The political situation in Sri Lanka and the perceived international community sentiment towards the parties to the conflict may affect the willingness of the diaspora to engage in productive discussions. Diaspora communities may be hesitant to participate in a diaspora program out of fear of intimidation by the other diaspora communities or of being targeted as a supporter of the LTTE. This applies in particular to the Tamil diaspora community, which may be concerned that their participation will subject them to host-state and Sinhalese diaspora scrutiny of being supporters of the LTTE.²⁵¹

To maximize the participation of all diaspora communities as well as the impact of the program, the implementers should ensure the uninhibited participation of all selected members of the diaspora community. Program implementers should make the selection processes for all participants transparent and be sensitive to the concerns of the diaspora community in being perceived as linked to the LTTE or other splinter groups. All participants should attend in their individual capacity rather than as a representative of an organization. In addition, program implementers may review the program materials, including invitations, schedules, and outcome documents to ensure that the participants' interests are not compromised or exposed to criticism for participation.

Maintaining Flexibility

Maintaining flexibility in a diaspora program is often a necessity, as roadblocks to the ideal functioning of a program often emerge. Logistical and scheduling problems take place with respect to difficulties in bringing together diaspora participants residing in various states. In ICAR's Ethiopian Extended

²⁵¹ See Hazel Smith, *Diasporas in International Conflict*, in DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT: PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS? 1, 7 (Hazel Smith & Paul Stares eds., 2007).

Dialogue, organizers were unable to include participants who represented the voice of those supporting the existing regime in Ethiopia.²⁵² This proved to be a drawback to the program, with participants' criticisms of the government during discussions in the program remaining unanswered. Although not ideal, the program was still able to bring together various members of the Ethiopian diaspora community and reach consensus on a number of issues pertaining to the conflict.

Further, diaspora communities often approach engagement programs with distinct needs and initial barriers that must be overcome to allow the program to be effective. Animosity among the participants in a diaspora program based on the root causes of the conflict may change the initial direction and topics of the discussion. In implementing a program to engage the Sri Lankan diaspora, facilitators may need to be flexible and work closely with the diaspora in determining the agenda and the issues discussed to build consensus among the parties and meet the identified goals. Maintaining a focus on the program goals allows facilitators to more adeptly evaluate proposed changes to the program and to restructure the program if necessary given the dynamic nature of conflict.

Maintaining Neutrality

The selection of neutral program facilitators encourages participation and candid discussion aimed at building consensus among the participants. Facilitators help prepare optimal conditions for the parties to engage in open discussion. Facilitators may help the parties open lines of communication, collect information, clarify their positions, articulate points of consensus when the parties reach an impasse, and provide financial, administrative, and technical support to diaspora communities to engage in activities that seek to move the peace process forward. Hosts and facilitators should be selected on the basis of their neutrality, with consideration to their past involvement with Sri Lanka, their past involvement in other similar conflicts, their reputation, and their facilitation skills. The facilitator's past involvement with other similar conflicts and diaspora programs demonstrate his or her ability to effectively manage such a program and to anticipate the interests and demands of the parties. Such experience may assist the facilitator in bringing the diaspora communities together and encouraging them to come to consensus.

In choosing a neutral facilitator, it can be particularly difficult balancing the need to have a facilitator knowledgeable on the predominant issues in the conflict,

²⁵² Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003, 14 (2004).

but also not bias toward one party to the conflict. Organizers should ensure the facilitator has an adept and thorough understanding of the conflict and its intricacies, as that will contribute to his/her credibility in the eyes of the program participants and members of the diaspora. A facilitator knowledgeable on issues regarding the conflict likely will also be more able to anticipate and react to changes in the conflict and the overall program. Often to acquire such an understanding, one may need to have past experiences either working with the Sri Lankan community or living in Sri Lanka. These past experiences may dictate whether potential facilitators' are perceived as being biased and should be scrutinized carefully prior to the commencement of an engagement program.

Regardless of whether real bias exists, diaspora communities are unlikely to engage in the program if one or more of the communities does not see the facilitator as impartial. For instance, the Tamil diaspora discredited the Federation of Sri Lankan Associations in Malaysia (FOMSO) diaspora program, alleging that FOMSO supported the Sinhalese diaspora and was incapable of holding an impartial diaspora program. Other aspects that should be taken into consideration in ensuring the neutrality of the program include a critical analysis of the language, location, title, and invited participants of the program. Providing a neutral facilitator encourages the diaspora communities to take ownership of the program and to fully support its outcome. Such ownership encourages further diaspora engagement in the home-state peace process.

Maintaining Confidentiality

To encourage consensus among the parties on the topics of discussion, the discussion should be kept confidential, and no statements resulting from the discussions should be attributed to individual participants. Consensus is possible only if the participants feel comfortable voicing their opinions and positions on the conflict, regardless of how contentious or controversial the issue is. Confidentiality encourages candid discussion free from political constraints and pressures on program participants' positions.

Due to the length of the Sri Lanka conflict and the strong sentiments of all diaspora communities, the diaspora program may be effective only when participants believe that their ideas will be kept in confidence. This will allow the participants to speak candidly and openly through all stages of the process and build the participants' trust in the facilitators. The Tamil diaspora in particular is capable of quickly and effectively disseminating information about diaspora programming. Dissemination of the substance of the meetings in the program

jeopardizes the legitimacy of the process and the sincerity of the participants. Participants in ICAR's Ethiopian Extended Dialogue agreed at the onset that the meetings would be confidential, that any statements or views expressed in documents written as a result of the meetings would not be attributed to individuals, and that any resulting documents divulging the outcomes of the meetings would not be disseminated beyond ICAR and the dialogue participants without first having the prior approval of all the program participants.²⁵³

An inability to maintain confidentiality in a diaspora engagement program also increases the likelihood that the program will be discredited and that the participants will disengage before the program is complete. A confidential program therefore empowers the diaspora to use the results of the program to encourage the advancement of the peace process through political pressure on the home state.

Creating a Final Product

The creation of a final work product could serve as a tangible goal for participants to achieve and serve as a measurement of the success of the program. Final products may include a list of recommendations to one or more parties to the peace process, a joint statement by members of the diaspora that outlines the commitment of the diaspora communities to the resolution of the conflict, and/or an overall dialogue report or consensus paper that reflects the points of consensus and/or impasses remaining within the diaspora community determined by participants in the program.

The final product for many diaspora programs is a list of recommendations that may be provided to peace negotiators. For instance, the Field Diplomacy Initiative (FDI)'s diaspora engagement program with the Burundian diaspora resulted in the creation of a series of recommendations on the peace process, which were published and provided to the parties to the conflict.²⁵⁴ PILPG's program with the Darfur Leader's Network (DLN) resulted in the development of recommendations intended to provide Darfuri negotiators with a common platform from which to engage the Sudanese government, while the Washington Nepal Forum (WNF) issued seventeen recommendations directed at the Nepal

²⁵³ Terrence Lyons, et al, THE ETHIOPIAN EXTENDED DIALOGUE: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT 2000-2003, 15 (2004).

²⁵⁴ Luc Reychler, *Field Diplomacy Initiatives in Cameroon and Burundi*, in PEACE-BUILDING, A FIELD GUIDE 90, 96 (Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., 2001).

government in reaching and implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.²⁵⁵

In comparison to recommendations, joint statements are typically drafted for a broader audience beyond negotiators or parties to the conflict, often are widely publicized, and may use stronger language to pressure parties to take action. In addition to recommendations developed through its work with PILPG, the DLN issued statements on the humanitarian situation in Darfur to raise awareness of the issue among the international and NGO community. Participants from prior Sri Lankan diaspora programs also issued joint statements that outlined their concerns regarding the humanitarian situation as well as their demands and commitment to resolve the conflict. The May 2008 INSD conference produced a publicly distributed six-point resolution calling for the resumption of peace talks and a political solution, appealing to parties to respect human rights and protect the media, encouraging the government to recognize the rights of minority groups living in Sri Lanka, and urging parties to reach a cessation to the violence.²⁵⁶ Similarly, the statement issued by the Sri Lankan Democracy Forum called for immediate action on behalf of the civilians suffering as result of the conflict.²⁵⁷

While joint statements may signify the unequivocal support of the diaspora for the peace process or humanitarian action, program facilitators may decide that a greater goal is encouraging dialogue rather than creating public pressure on parties to the conflict and thus focus on preparing a consensus paper or dialogue report. Diaspora participants in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), following small group meetings and plenary debate sessions, drafted a list of recommendations for the peace process in Darfur, which were later used as part of a larger report reflecting the engagement program process and areas of consensus reached among the participants.²⁵⁸ The DDDC used the report to assist in its efforts in promoting a successful peace process in Darfur.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁵ Washington Nepal Forum, News, available at <http://www.washingtonnepalforum.org/news.html>.

²⁵⁶ Free Media and INSD, *Press Release: Resolution of Conference on International Diaspora Respond to Sri Lankan Current Situation*, (May 2008), available at http://shots.snap.com/explore/22669/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsrilankandiasporablog.files.wordpress.com%2F2008%2F06%2Fresolution-insd.pdf&key=e5a3c1e6dff5de35b1c6e7c470411886&src=pub-2311827-www.wordpress.com&cp=&tol=url_arrow.

²⁵⁷ *Sri Lanka: Diaspora Organizations Demand GOSL and LTTE Act Immediately to Prevent Humanitarian Catastrophe*, SRI LANKA DEMOCRACY FORUM, Jan. 30, 2009, available at <http://www.sacw.net/article563.html>.

²⁵⁸ Darfur-Darfur Dialogue & Consultation, DDDC Consultations, available at <http://www.dddc.org/consultations.shtml>.

²⁵⁹ Susan Hayward, USIPeace Briefing: Engaging the Darfur Diaspora for Peace, United States Institute of Peace (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0221_darfur_diaspora.html; United States Institute of Peace, *Reclaiming Common Ground, Addressing Long-Term Challenges to Peace in Darfur*, (2008), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/darfur_diaspora.pdf.

Prior to the program's commencement, facilitators and participants should agree upon the type of final product and its distribution. Due to the confidentiality concerns prevalent in diaspora engagement programs, facilitators and participants need to determine with whom the final product will be shared with and for what purpose. Instead of issuing a joint statement or recommendations, facilitators and participants may decide to circulate a consensus paper or dialogue report to only program facilitators, participants, and/or a limited distribution list, which may include peace negotiators or the host or home state governments. If participants express real concerns about the distribution of any final product, facilitators must take this into account and decide whether the benefits of greater distribution are worth the risks of less candid dialogue. Regardless, preparers of any final product must be careful to not attribute statements to participants in any report or statement.

Defining goals, maintaining flexibility, ensuring unimpeded participation of diaspora members, maintaining neutrality, and guaranteeing confidentiality are important factors to consider in planning an effective Sri Lanka diaspora engagement program. Establishing guidelines for a diaspora engagement program that include the above-listed considerations likely would improve the smooth functioning of the program, promote confidence in the organizing of the program among the diaspora community, and create a useful final product based on consensus forged among the program participants. Final products created as a result of diaspora engagement programs, whether they be recommendations to peace negotiations, joint statements issued to the public, or consensus papers distributed to only facilitators and participants, can be helpful in moving a peace process forward and in expressing the diaspora community's commitment to a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

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